cve.bz

CAPEC-464

Evercookie

Medium severityStandard pattern

An attacker creates a very persistent cookie that stays present even after the user thinks it has been removed. The cookie is stored on the victim's machine in over ten places. When the victim clears the cookie cache via traditional means inside the browser, that operation removes the cookie from certain places but not others. The malicious code then replicates the cookie from all of the places where it was not deleted to all of the possible storage locations once again. So the victim again has the cookie in all of the original storage locations. In other words, failure to delete the cookie in even one location will result in the cookie's resurrection everywhere. The evercookie will also persist across different browsers because certain stores (e.g., Local Shared Objects) are shared between different browsers.

On this page

The places a persistent cookie is stored on a victim's machine include: Standard HTTP Cookies, Local Shared Objects (Flash Cookies), Silverlight Isolated Storage, Storing cookies in RGB values of auto-generated, force-cached, PNGs using HTML5 Canvas tag to read pixels (cookies) back out, Storing cookies in Web History, Storing cookies in HTTP ETags, Storing cookies in Web cache, window.name caching, Internet Explorer userData storage, HTML5 Session Storage, HTML5 Local Storage, HTML5 Global Storage, HTML5 Database Storage via SQLite, among others.

Ask an AI about this attack pattern

Show the promptExplain the attack pattern CAPEC-464: Evercookie: how it unfolds, what it needs and how to prevent and detect it in my systems. Use https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/464.html and https://cve.bz/cve/capec/464?via=ask-ai-copy, which lists recent CVEs with the weaknesses it exploits. Cite the sources.

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Prerequisites

  • The victim's browser is not configured to reject all cookiesThe victim visits a website that serves the attackers' evercookie

Resources required

  • Evercookie source code

Mitigations

  • Design: Browser's design needs to be changed to limit where cookies can be stored on the client side and provide an option to clear these cookies in all places, as well as another option to stop these cookies from being written in the first place.

  • Design: Safari browser's private browsing mode is currently effective against evercookies.

Weaknesses it exploits

  • CWE-359 Exposure of Private Personal Information to an Unauthorized Actor

Recent CVEs with these weaknesses

  1. 8.2CVE-2026-124037

    An information exposure flaw in the public access-list sign-up feature of the Flock Safety Platform, present from 2026-06-23 to 2026-10-22, allowed a remote, unauthenticated attacker who had a community's public sign-up link and a register…

  2. 5.9CVE-2026-111753

    Angular is a development platform for building mobile and desktop web applications using TypeScript/JavaScript and other languages. Prior to 20.3.34 and 21.0.3, the @angular/common HttpClient function xsrfInterceptorFn uses a regular expre…

  3. 6.1CVE-2026-54144

    OpenHuman is an open-source agent harness available as a desktop application and Rust library. Before 0.56.0 on macOS, the runtime injected into a supported remote account webview such as Google Meet allows page JavaScript to call getDispl…

  4. 5.5CVE-2026-85916

    Exposure of private personal information to an unauthorized actor in Azure Active Directory allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information locally.

  5. 4.3CVE-2026-102579

    A flaw was found in Moodle. An incorrect capability check in the grade web service allows an authenticated student to access profile information of other students enrolled in the same course that they should not have permission to view. Th…

  6. 4.9CVE-2026-39372

    InvoicePlane is a self-hosted open source application for managing invoices, clients, and payments. Prior to 1.7.2, InvoicePlane stores and serves uploaded image attachments without stripping EXIF metadata. When an administrator uploads an…

  7. 4.7CVE-2026-54565

    rhwp is an HWP viewer and editor implemented in Rust and WebAssembly. Prior to rhwp 0.7.15 and rhwp Chrome and Firefox extension 0.2.4, the browser extensions use an all-URLs host permission to detect HWP and HWPX links on visited pages, b…

  8. 6.5CVE-2026-61588

    djust provides Phoenix LiveView-style reactive server-side rendering for Django with Rust-powered performance. Prior to version 1.0.7, when a Django `Model` instance is assigned to a public view attribute, djust serialized it to the client…

The newest records naming one of them. Each weakness's page lists them all.

Part of

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