CVE-2026-34067

nimiq-transaction provides the transaction primitive to be used in Nimiq's Rust implementation. Prior to version 1.3.0, `HistoryTreeProof::verify` panics on a malformed proof where `history.len() != positions.len()` due to `assert_eq!(history.len(), positions.len())`. The proof object is derived from untrusted p2p responses (`ResponseTransactionsProof.proof`) and is therefore attacker-controlled at the network boundary until validated. A malicious peer could trigger a crash by returning a crafted inclusion proof with a length mismatch. The patch for this vulnerability is included as part of v1.3.0. No known workarounds are available.

CVSS 3.1

6.5CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

EPSS

0.3% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days; higher than 24% of CVEs (scores of 2026-10-26)

CWE

CWE-617

Published

2026-04-22

Modified

2026-10-26

Record from

the NVD, synced 2026-10-26

Affected

• nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake

Packages (OSV)

References

• https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/commit/6ff0800e8e031363e787c827d8d033e5694e4e6a
• https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/pull/3659
• https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/releases/tag/v1.3.0
• https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/security/advisories/GHSA-264v-m8fm-76jm

Check your stackJSON