CVSS 3.1
7.8 highCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HHigh (7.8) in virtualenv virtualenv. EPSS 0.3% estimated probability of exploitation activity in the next 30 days. Fixed in virtualenv 21.14.7.
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:Hvirtualenv (PyPI): fixed in 21.14.7Explain CVE-2026-113725 for an engineer deciding whether to act. Use https://cve.bz/api/public/cves/CVE-2026-113725?via=ask-ai-copy and https://cve.bz/cve/CVE-2026-113725?via=ask-ai-copy as the source of truth: what is affected and which versions fix it, whether it is in CISA KEV, public exploits, and its EPSS (an internet-wide 30-day estimate of exploitation activity, not a forecast for my systems). If they give no fixed versions, use the CVE record https://cveawg.mitre.org/api/cve/CVE-2026-113725 or the vendor advisory, not third-party mirrors. Tell me how to check whether I am affected and how to verify a fix. Cite the sources and say where they are uncertain.Opens a third-party assistant; its answer is its own, not cve.bz's. The prompt holds only this CVE's id and public links.
From the NVD's CPE matches.
| Product | Affected |
|---|---|
| virtualenv:virtualenv | before 21.14.7 |
| Advisory | Ecosystem | Package | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GHSA-vxj4-q4g9-crj7 | PyPI | virtualenv | <21.14.7 | 21.14.7 |
| Distribution | Release | Package | Fixed in | Advisory |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debian | 12, 13, 14 | python-virtualenv | no fix listed | DEBIAN-CVE-2026-113725 |
| Ubuntu | 14.04:LTS, 16.04:LTS, 18.04:LTS and 5 more | python-virtualenv | no fix listed | UBUNTU-CVE-2026-113725 |
| Azure Linux | 3 | python-pip | no fix listed | AZL-110073 |
| Azure Linux | 3 | python-virtualenv | 20.36.1-10 | AZL-110115 |
From the distributions' data via OSV.dev: the Debian Security Tracker; Ubuntu Security Notices © Canonical Ltd., CC BY-SA 4.0; Microsoft's Azure Linux vulnerability data, MIT. Modified: reformatted and linked to CVE records. Credits. On the distributions' own pages: Debian · Ubuntu.
Red Hat rates this Important.
Red Hat rates this vulnerability as Important because an attacker can execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of a user who activates a compromised or maliciously named Python virtual environment. While exploitation requires user interaction to source the activation script, developer workstations and automated build environments frequently clone repositories or ingest external directory names, elevating the practical risk of executing untrusted activation scripts. Systems where virtual environments are generated exclusively from trusted names or run non-interactively without prompt evaluation are not affected.
--- CME Mitigation Guidance (2026-10-20) ---
Disclaimer: The following mitigation solutions are provided as a courtesy, pending the application of an official patch. This content was generated utilizing AI tools in conjunction with data from https://cmetaxonomy.org. Customers are advised to independently evaluate and test these temporary mitigations within their own infrastructure.
The highest-value action is to sanitize virtual environment names and eliminate unescaped shell variable interpolation in bash prompt configuration scripts: upgrade to virtualenv 21.14.7 (or the fixed Uv/Rhoai/Odh Kserve Agent Rhel/Rhoai/Odh Kserve Controller Rhel/Rhoai/Odh Kserve Router Rhel/Rhoai/Odh Kserve Storage Initializer Rhel/Python Virtualenv/Rhoai/Odh Feature Server Rhel/Python3.11 Virtualenv/Python3.12 Virtualenv/Devspaces/Udi Rhel/Rhoai/Odh Ta Lmes Job Rhel/Cloudservices/Advisor Backend/Satellite/Iop Host Inventory Rhel/Satellite/Iop Yuptoo Rhel/Ansible Automation Platform 26/Lightspeed Chatbot Rhel/Satellite/Iop Advisor Backend Rhel/Ansible Automation Platform 26/Controller Rhel/Ansible Automation Platform 27/Controller Rhel/Ansible Ai Connect Service/Insights Host Inventory/Rhoai/Odh Training Rocm64 Torch28 Py312 Rhel/Cloudservices/Ros Backend/Redhat User Workloads/Mintmaker Renovate Image/Koku Daily/Nise Populator/Openshift Lightspeed/Lightspeed Service Api Rhel/Rhoai/Odh Trustyai Nemo Guardrails Server Rhel/Ansible Chatbot Stack/Rhoai/Odh Workbench Codeserver Datascience Cpu Py312 Rhel/Rhoai/Odh Workbench Jupyter Datascience Cpu Py312 Rhel/Rhoai/Odh Workbench Jupyter Pytorch Llmcompressor Cuda Py312 Rhel/Cloudservices/Rbac/Cloudservices/Yuptoo/Rhel Cla/Rlsapi Rhel/Rhai Early Access/Docling Serve Cuda Rhel/Digital Roadmap Backend/Ansible Automation Platform 27/Eda Controller Rhel/Automation Hub Container/Ansible Automation Platform 26/Eda Controller Rhel/Vulnerability Engine builds), which escape backslashes, dollar signs, and backticks a second time in activate.sh under bash to prevent expansion across both prompt evaluation passes, closing all 3 injection vectors (crafted environment name, crafted directory name, crafted prompt parameter). Until patched, this is only a concern on non-root bash shell sessions with promptvars enabled sourcing untrusted virtual environment activation scripts — root bash sessions and zsh shell environments are unaffected — so avoid sourcing untrusted activate scripts, set VIRTUAL_ENV_DISABLE_PROMPT=1 in the environment, disable promptvars via shopt -u promptvars, and restrict untrusted directory or environment names. As a compensating measure, deploy EDR agents to detect anomalous child processes spawned from interactive bash shell sessions during prompt evaluation, configure auditd to log execve syscalls initiated when bash evaluates prompt command substitutions, and use Falco or eBPF runtime monitoring to detect unexpected commands and child processes spawned during prompt substitution. These controls limit blast radius and contain exploitation, but they do not fix the underlying incomplete prompt escaping defect — apply the upstream patch to fully remediate.
Highest-impact CME: CME-1307 Command Injection Prevention (No Shell Invocation) (high)
| Product | Package | State | Advisory |
|---|---|---|---|
| OpenShift Lightspeed | openshift-lightspeed/lightspeed-service-api-rhel9 | Will not fix | |
| Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2 | ansible-automation-platform-26/controller-rhel9 | Affected | |
| Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2 | ansible-automation-platform-26/eda-controller-rhel9 | Not affected | |
| Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2 | ansible-automation-platform-26/lightspeed-chatbot-rhel9 | Affected | |
| Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2 | ansible-automation-platform-27/controller-rhel9 | Affected | |
| Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2 | ansible-automation-platform-27/eda-controller-rhel9 | Not affected | |
| Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2 | python3.11-virtualenv | Not affected | |
| Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2 | python3.12-virtualenv | Affected | |
| Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2 | python-virtualenv | Affected | |
| Red Hat OpenShift AI (RHOAI) | rhai-early-access/docling-serve-cuda-rhel9 | Affected | |
| Red Hat OpenShift AI (RHOAI) | rhoai/odh-feature-server-rhel9 | Affected | |
| Red Hat OpenShift AI (RHOAI) | rhoai/odh-kserve-agent-rhel9 | Not affected | |
| Red Hat OpenShift AI (RHOAI) | rhoai/odh-kserve-controller-rhel9 | Not affected | |
| Red Hat OpenShift AI (RHOAI) | rhoai/odh-kserve-router-rhel9 | Not affected | |
| Red Hat OpenShift AI (RHOAI) | rhoai/odh-kserve-storage-initializer-rhel9 | Not affected | |
| Red Hat OpenShift AI (RHOAI) | rhoai/odh-ta-lmes-job-rhel9 | Affected | |
| Red Hat OpenShift AI (RHOAI) | rhoai/odh-training-rocm64-torch28-py312-rhel9 | Not affected | |
| Red Hat OpenShift AI (RHOAI) | rhoai/odh-trustyai-nemo-guardrails-server-rhel9 | Affected | |
| Red Hat OpenShift AI (RHOAI) | rhoai/odh-workbench-codeserver-datascience-cpu-py312-rhel9 | Affected | |
| Red Hat OpenShift AI (RHOAI) | rhoai/odh-workbench-jupyter-datascience-cpu-py312-rhel9 | Affected | |
| 6 more in the JSON and on Red Hat's page. | |||
Contains Red Hat Security Data © Red Hat, Inc., licensed under CC BY 4.0. Source: https://access.redhat.com/security/data. Modified: reformatted. Red Hat's page for CVE-2026-113725.
The attack patterns MITRE's CAPEC relates to this record's weaknesses, as MITRE names them. Credits.
Changes since this site first stored the record. The same for every record: /api/public/changes.