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CVE-2026-104795 Execution with Unnecessary Privileges

8.8 highEPSS 0.2%Fix available

High (8.8). EPSS 0.2% estimated probability of exploitation activity in the next 30 days.

On this page
The insights-runtime-extractor runs as a privileged DaemonSet (`hostPID: true`) that scans container processes for runtime fingerprinting. When scanning a container, the coordinator: 1. **fork()s** a child process 2. **setns()** into the target container's PID and mount namespaces 3. **fchdir()** back to an orphaned FD pointing at the extractor's own root filesystem (where `/crio.sock` is hostPath-mounted) 4. Calls **only `seteuid(target_uid)`** — changing the effective UID but leaving the **real UID and saved-set-UID at 0** and **retaining the permitted capability set** 5. The `check_no_privileged_perms()` guard inspects only the Effective capability set (so it passes), and is **skipped entirely when the target runs as uid 0** 6. The `VersionExecutable` fingerprint invokes `fpr_kind_executable` with `process.command_line[0]` — the target's argv[0], read from `/proc/<pid>/cmdline` and **fully controlled by the workload** 7. `fpr_kind_executable` calls `exec.Command(executable, "--version").Output()` — executing the **workload's own binary** inside the workload's mount namespace while **ruid=0 in the host user namespace** The executed process can call `setuid(0)` to restore full root with `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`, and inherits the orphaned cwd which resolves into the extractor container's filesystem containing the host CRI-O socket. ## Affected Code ### 1. Insufficient privilege drop (Rust — extractor coordinator) **File:** `extractor/src/insights_runtime_extractor.rs` ```rust // Lines 139-146 — seteuid-only drop, guard skipped for root containers join_process_namespaces(process.pid)?; change_dir(current_dir); switch_user(*process.uid)?; if *process.uid != 0 { perms::check_no_privileged_perms() .expect("Must not have privileged permissions to run fingerprints"); } fingerprint::run_fingerprints(&config, out_dir, &process); ``` ```rust // Lines 182-185 — only effective UID changed; ruid/suid stay 0 fn switch_user(uid: u32) -> Result<(), ScannerError> { debug!("... Becoming user: {uid}"); seteuid(uid.into()).map_err(|e| ScannerError::Errno(e)) } ``` ### 2. Execution of untrusted binary (Go — fingerprint) **File:** `fingerprints/pkg/utils/file.go` ```go // Lines 75-80 — executes a path taken verbatim from workload's argv[0] func GetExecutableVersionOutput(executable string) (string, error) { out, err := exec.Command(executable, "--version").Output() if err != nil { return "", err } return string(out), nil } ``` ### 3. Workload-controlled path forwarded (Rust — version_executable) **File:** `version_executable.rs` ```rust // Lines 29-34 — workload-controlled command_line[0] forwarded to fingerprint return Some(vec![ fpr_kind_executable, out_dir.to_string(), String::from(&process.command_line[0]), String::from(&version_executable.runtime_kind_name), ]); ``` ## Attack Pattern **Attacker:** Any tenant able to schedule a pod (unprivileged, any namespace) **Victim:** The node running the insights-runtime-extractor DaemonSet **Trigger:** Automatic — the DaemonSet scans all container processes on the node **Attack sequence:** 1. Attacker creates a pod whose process name matches a configured versioned-executable pattern (`node`, `python`, `python3`, `MainThread`, or contains `java`) 2. The pod's main binary (at the path matching argv[0]) is a malicious executable that calls `setuid(0)` to restore root 3. When the insights operator triggers a scan, the DaemonSet forks, enters the attacker's mount namespace, and executes the attacker's binary with ruid=0 4. The attacker's code regains full root with `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` in the host user namespace 5. The inherited cwd contains the host CRI-O socket → full node compromise

Severity

CVSS 3.1

8.8 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
EPSS
0.2% (unchanged from 0.2% a week ago; 0.2% 30 days ago) estimated probability of exploitation activity in the next 30 days; 8th percentile. Scored 2026-11-17. A forecast for this CVE across the internet, not for your own systems.
CISA's assessment (SSVC)
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total, assessed 2026-10-14. From CISA's Vulnrichment in the CVE List: whether it is exploited, whether exploiting it can be automated, and how much control it gives.
CWE
CWE-250 Execution with Unnecessary Privileges
Published
Modified
NVD analysis
Awaiting analysis
Record from
the NVD, synced

Fix and patched versions

  • Red Hat Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.19: fixed in 1792771524
  • Red Hat Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.20: fixed in 1792849665
  • Red Hat Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.21: fixed in 1792008935
  • Red Hat Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.22: fixed in 1792844435

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Versions

From the CNA's record in the CVE List.

Fixed in

ProductFixed in
Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.191792771524
Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.201792849665
Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.211792008935
Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.221792844435

Red Hat

Red Hat rates this Important.

Red Hat's statement

The extractor runs as a privileged DaemonSet that scans container processes for runtime fingerprinting. When scanning a container, the coordinator performs an incomplete privilege drop — using only seteuid() to change the effective UID while leaving the real UID and saved-set-UID at 0 and retaining all Linux capabilities in the permitted set.

A malicious workload can supply a crafted binary that restores full root privileges

via setuid(0), gaining CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the host user namespace and access to the host container runtime socket. This allows a complete container escape with host-level root access.

Red Hat's mitigation

The vulnerability requires a

code fix to implement a complete privilege drop (setting all three UID/GID

fields, clearing all Linux capability sets, and setting `PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS`)

before executing any fingerprint binary.

ProductPackageStateAdvisory
Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.19openshift4/insights-runtime-extractor-rhel9:1792771524Fixed 2026-10-26RHSA-2026:89655
Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.20openshift4/insights-runtime-extractor-rhel9:1792849665Fixed 2026-10-26RHSA-2026:89341
Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.21openshift4/insights-runtime-extractor-rhel9:1792008935Fixed 2026-10-20RHSA-2026:83702
Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.22openshift4/insights-runtime-extractor-rhel9:1792844435Fixed 2026-10-27RHSA-2026:89198
Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 5openshift5/insights-runtime-extractor-rhel9Affected

Contains Red Hat Security Data © Red Hat, Inc., licensed under CC BY 4.0. Source: https://access.redhat.com/security/data. Modified: reformatted. Red Hat's page for CVE-2026-104795.

Attack patterns (CAPEC)

  • CAPEC-69 Target Programs with Elevated Privileges Likelihood: High · Severity: Very High
  • CAPEC-104 Cross Zone Scripting Likelihood: Medium · Severity: High
  • CAPEC-470 Expanding Control over the Operating System from the Database Severity: Very High

The attack patterns MITRE's CAPEC relates to this record's weaknesses, as MITRE names them. Credits.

References

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