High (8.8) in linuxfoundation edge virtualization engine. EPSS 0.1% estimated probability of exploitation activity in the next 30 days. Fixed in github.com/lf-edge/eve 0.0.0-20230519072751-977f42b07fa9.
Vault Key Sealed With SHA1 PCRs
The measured boot solution implemented in EVE OS leans on a PCR locking mechanism.
Different parts of the system update different PCR values in the TPM, resulting in a unique
value for each PCR entry.
These PCRs are then used in order to seal/unseal a key from the TPM which is used to
encrypt/decrypt the “vault” directory.
This “vault” directory is the most sensitive point in the system and as such, its content should
be protected.
This mechanism is noted in Zededa’s documentation as the “measured boot” mechanism,
designed to protect said “vault”.
The code that’s responsible for generating and fetching the key from the TPM assumes that
SHA256 PCRs are used in order to seal/unseal the key, and as such their presence is being
checked.
The issue here is that the key is not sealed using SHA256 PCRs, but using SHA1 PCRs.
This leads to several issues:
• Machines that have their SHA256 PCRs enabled but SHA1 PCRs disabled, as well
as not sealing their keys at all, meaning the “vault” is not protected from an attacker.
• SHA1 is considered insecure and reduces the complexity level required to unseal the
key in machines which have their SHA1 PCRs enabled.
An attacker can very easily retrieve the contents of the “vault”, which will effectively render
the “measured boot” mechanism meaningless.
Severity
CVSS 3.1
8.8 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
EPSS
0.1%(unchanged from 0.1% a week ago; 0.1% 30 days ago) estimated probability of exploitation activity in the next 30 days; 2nd percentile. Scored 2026-11-22. A forecast for this CVE across the internet, not for your own systems.
CISA's assessment (SSVC)
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total, assessed 2024-09-25. From CISA's Vulnrichment in the CVE List: whether it is exploited, whether exploiting it can be automated, and how much control it gives.
CWEs
CWE-327Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm CWE-328Use of Weak Hash CWE-522Insufficiently Protected Credentials
Show the promptExplain CVE-2023-43635 for an engineer deciding whether to act. Use https://cve.bz/api/public/cves/CVE-2023-43635?via=ask-ai-copy and https://cve.bz/cve/CVE-2023-43635?via=ask-ai-copy as the source of truth: what is affected and which versions fix it, whether it is in CISA KEV, public exploits, and its EPSS (an internet-wide 30-day estimate of exploitation activity, not a forecast for my systems). If they give no fixed versions, use the CVE record https://cveawg.mitre.org/api/cve/CVE-2023-43635 or the vendor advisory, not third-party mirrors. Tell me how to check whether I am affected and how to verify a fix. Cite the sources and say where they are uncertain.
Opens a third-party assistant; its answer is its own, not cve.bz's. The prompt holds only this CVE's id and public links.
From the distributions' data via OSV.dev: SUSE security data, CC BY 4.0. Modified: reformatted and linked to CVE records. Credits. On the distributions' own pages: openSUSE.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
CAPEC-68 Subvert Code-signing Facilities Likelihood: Low · Severity: Very High
CAPEC-461 Web Services API Signature Forgery Leveraging Hash Function Extension Weakness Severity: High