CAPEC-68
Subvert Code-signing Facilities
Many languages use code signing facilities to vouch for code's identity and to thus tie code to its assigned privileges within an environment. Subverting this mechanism can be instrumental in an attacker escalating privilege. Any means of subverting the way that a virtual machine enforces code signing classifies for this style of attack.
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Explain the attack pattern CAPEC-68: Subvert Code-signing Facilities: how it unfolds, what it needs and how to prevent and detect it in my systems. Use https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/68.html and https://cve.bz/cve/capec/68?via=ask-ai-copy, which lists recent CVEs with the weaknesses it exploits. Cite the sources.Opens a third-party assistant; its answer is its own, not cve.bz's. The prompt holds only this attack pattern's id and public links.
Prerequisites
A framework-based language that supports code signing (such as, and most commonly, Java or .NET)
Deployed code that has been signed by its authoring vendor, or a partner.
The attacker will, for most circumstances, also need to be able to place code in the victim container. This does not necessarily mean that they will have to subvert host-level security, except when explicitly indicated.
Skills required
- High skill
Subverting code signing is not a trivial activity. Most code signing and verification schemes are based on use of cryptography and the attacker needs to have an understanding of these cryptographic operations in good detail. Additionally the attacker also needs to be aware of the way memory is assigned and accessed by the container since, often, the only way to subvert code signing would be to patch the code in memory. Finally, a knowledge of the platform specific mechanisms of signing and verifying code is a must.
Resources required
The Attacker needs no special resources beyond the listed prerequisites in order to conduct this style of attack.
Consequences
| Impact | Affects | Note |
|---|---|---|
| Gain Privileges | Confidentiality, Access Control, Authorization |
Mitigations
A given code signing scheme may be fallible due to improper use of cryptography. Developers must never roll out their own cryptography, nor should existing primitives be modified or ignored.
If an attacker cannot attack the scheme directly, they might try to alter the environment that affects the signing and verification processes. A possible mitigation is to avoid reliance on flags or environment variables that are user-controllable.
Weaknesses it exploits
- CWE-325 Missing Cryptographic Step
- CWE-328 Use of Weak Hash
- CWE-1326 Missing Immutable Root of Trust in Hardware
Recent CVEs with these weaknesses
- 6.4CVE-2026-109805
Due to a weak HMAC cryptography calculation when receiving an RFC callback in SAP NetWeaver and ABAP Platform (Application Server ABAP), an authenticated attacker with high privileges and access to a network segment between application ser…
- 4.3CVE-2026-108910
IBM Db2 Genius Hub 1.1.2, 1.1.3, 1.1.4, 1.1.5 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to obtain sensitive information due to missing required cryptographic step.
- 8.1CVE-2026-117957
Cryptographic issue in the WebRTC: Networking component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 159, Firefox ESR 153.6, Thunderbird 159, and Thunderbird 153.6.
- 3.1CVE-2026-109839
IBM Db2 Genius Hub 1.0 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to bypass security restrictions due to a missing initialization vector in the cryptographic algorithm.
- 8.7CVE-2026-101294
IBM WebSphere Application Server - Liberty 17.0.0.3 through 26.0.0.10 and IBM WebSphere Application Server 8.5, and 9.0 could allow a remote attacker to bypass cryptographic signature verification due to improper verification of cryptograp…
- 7.1CVE-2026-65104
NVIDIA Megatron-LM for all platforms contains a vulnerability in inference, where an attacker could cause hash collisions in the cache used for inference requests. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to data tampering and…
- 6.3CVE-2026-107785
Crux Agent from 1.9.0 before 2.0.3 uses the full SKA bilocation key as the WireGuard preshared key. When a peering session negotiates use of SHA-512, the key produced is 64 bytes instead of the 32 bytes WireGuard requires. The agent does n…
- 9.1CVE-2026-97468
Apache CXF's STSTokenValidator and Security Token Service (STS) cached validated security tokens under a non-cryptographic 32-bit hash of the token (Java Arrays.hashCode/hashCode()), and treated a cache hit as proof that the presented toke…
The newest records naming one of them. Each weakness's page lists them all.
Related attack patterns
- Part of
- CAPEC-233 Privilege Escalation
Examples
In old versions (prior to 3.0b4) of the Netscape web browser Attackers able to foist a malicious Applet into …
In old versions (prior to 3.0b4) of the Netscape web browser Attackers able to foist a malicious Applet into a client's browser could execute the "Magic Coat" attack. In this attack, the offending Applet would implement its own getSigners() method. This implementation would use the containing VM's APIs to acquire other Applet's signatures (by calling _their_ getSigners() method) and if any running Applet had privileged-enough signature, the malicious Applet would have inherited that privilege just be (metaphorically) donning the others' coats.
Some (older) web browsers allowed scripting languages, such as JavaScript, to call signed Java code. In these…
Some (older) web browsers allowed scripting languages, such as JavaScript, to call signed Java code. In these circumstances, the browser's VM implementation would choose not to conduct stack inspection across language boundaries (from called signed Java to calling JavaScript) and would short-circuit "true" at the language boundary. Doing so meant that the VM would allow any (unprivileged) script to call privileged functions within signed code with impunity, causing them to fall prey to luring attacks.
The ability to load unsigned code into the kernel of earlier versions of Vista and bypass integrity checking …
The ability to load unsigned code into the kernel of earlier versions of Vista and bypass integrity checking is an example of such subversion. In the proof-of-concept, it is possible to bypass the signature-checking mechanism Vista uses to load device drivers.
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