CAPEC-693

Many open-source software packages are hosted via third-party package managers (e.g., Node Package Manager, PyPi, Yarn, etc.) that allow for easy integration of software components into existing development environments. A package manager will typically include various metadata about the software and often include a link to the package's source code repository, to assist developers in determining the trustworthiness of the software. One common statistic used in this decision-making process is the popularity of the package. This entails checking the amount of "Stars" the package has received, which the package manager displays based on the provided source code repository URL. However, many package managers do not validate the connection between the package and source code repository being provided. Adversaries can thus spoof the popularity statistic of a malicious package by associating a popular source code repository URL with the package. This can ultimately trick developers into unintentionally incorporating the malicious package into their development environment.

How the attack unfolds

1. Explore

   The attacker looks for a way in.

   1. [Identify target] The adversary must first identify a target package whose popularity statistics will be leveraged. This will be a popular and widely used package, as to increase the perceived pedigree of the malicious package.

2. Experiment

   They probe what they found.

   2. [Spoof package popularity] The adversary provides their malicious package to a package manager and uses the source code repository URL identified in Step 1 to spoof the popularity of the package. This malicious package may also closely resemble the legitimate package whose statistics are being utilized.

3. Exploit

   They carry out the attack.

   3. [Exploit victims] The adversary infiltrates development environments with the goal of conducting additional attacks.

      2 techniques

      • Active: The adversary attempts to trick victims into downloading the malicious package by means such as phishing and social engineering.
      • Passive: The adversary waits for victims to download and leverage the malicious package.

Prerequisites

• Identification of a popular open-source package whose popularity metadata is to be used for the malicious package.

Skills required

• Low skill

  Ability to provide a package to a package manager and associate a popular package's source code repository URL.

Consequences

Mitigations

• Before downloading open-source packages, perform precursory metadata checks to determine the author(s), frequency of updates, when the software was last updated, and if the software is widely leveraged.

• Look for conflicting or non-unique repository references to determine if multiple packages share the same repository reference.

• Reference vulnerability databases to determine if the software contains known vulnerabilities.

• Only download open-source packages from reputable package managers.

• After downloading open-source packages, ensure integrity values have not changed.

• Before executing or incorporating the package, leverage automated testing techniques (e.g., static and dynamic analysis) to determine if the software behaves maliciously.

Weaknesses it exploits

• CWE-494 Download of Code Without Integrity Check

Recent CVEs with these weaknesses

1. 7.2CVE-2026-1187912026-11-09

   The application implements software update functionality without adequate authenticity and integrity validation, allowing update packages to be accepted without sufficient cryptographic verification.

2. 6.3CVE-2026-1121702026-11-09

   The software downloads upgrade files without performing integrity checks, allowing the installation of tampered updates.

3. 9.2CVE-2026-1184622026-11-09

   Update components download and execute code without proper authenticity verification, relying on ignored hashes or forgeable checksums. Some update paths also permit archive traversal or script execution.

4. 2.0CVE-2026-1235082026-11-08

   Vikunja before 2.7.1 contains a supply chain vulnerability in its mage release targets that fetch the xgo module and Docker image by mutable latest references. Attackers who compromise the upstream xgo module, image, or registry can inject…

5. 7.5CVE-2026-1046572026-11-06

   Missing integrity verification in the Progress Software Fiddler Download and Setup Skill on Linux, macOS, and Windows which allows an attacker to compromise or influence a release component and execute attacker-controlled code when a user …

6. 2.1CVE-2026-1217502026-11-04

   Node Version Manager (nvm) is a POSIX-compliant shell function for managing multiple node.js versions. In versions 0.40.5 through 0.40.8, `nvm_download_artifact` downloads a release archive directly to its final path in `$NVM_DIR/.cache` a…

7. 8.6CVE-2026-1100222026-11-04

   The PFI plugin framework deploys executable assemblies (DLLs) from a signed plugin package into the local plugin repository and loads them via reflection, but the deployment routine processes archive entries that were never covered by the …

8. 7.4CVE-2026-920922026-10-29

   A flaw was found in openshift-ansible. The installer container's `run` script downloads and executes remote inventory and dynamic scripts without integrity verification. A remote attacker, by performing a Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack or…

The newest records naming one of them. Each weakness's page lists them all.

Related attack patterns

Part of

• CAPEC-691 Spoof Open-Source Software Metadata

Examples

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