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CAPEC-673

Developer Signing Maliciously Altered Software

High severityMedium likelihoodDetailed pattern

Software produced by a reputable developer is clandestinely infected with malicious code and then digitally signed by the unsuspecting developer, where the software has been altered via a compromised software development or build process prior to being signed. The receiver or user of the software has no reason to believe that it is anything but legitimate and proceeds to deploy it to organizational systems.

This attack differs from CAPEC-206, since the developer is inadvertently signing malicious code they believe to be legitimate and which they are unware of any malicious modifications.

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Prerequisites

  • An adversary would need to have access to a targeted developer’s software development environment, including to their software build processes, where the adversary could ensure code maliciously tainted prior to a build process is included in software packages built.

Skills required

  • High skill

    The adversary must have the skills to infiltrate a developer’s software development/build environment and to implant malicious code in developmental software code, a build server, or a software repository containing dependency code, which would be referenced to be included during the software build process.

Consequences

What a successful attack can lead to
ImpactAffectsNote
Read Data, Modify DataIntegrity, Confidentiality
Gain Privileges, Execute Unauthorized CommandsAccess Control, Authorization

Mitigations

  • Have a security concept of operations (CONOPS) for the IDE that includes: Protecting the IDE via logical isolation using firewall and DMZ technologies/architectures; Maintaining strict security administration and configuration management of configuration management tools, developmental software and dependency code repositories, compilers, and system build tools.

  • Employ intrusion detection and malware detection capabilities on IDE systems where feasible.

Part of

Examples

An adversary who has infiltrated an organization’s build environment maliciously alters code intended to be i…

An adversary who has infiltrated an organization’s build environment maliciously alters code intended to be included in a product’s software build via software dependency inclusion, part of the software build process. When the software product has been built, the developer electronically signs the finished product using their signing key. The recipient of the software product, an end user/customer, believes the software to reflect the developer’s intent with respect to functionality unaware of the adversary’s malicious intent harbored within.

MITRE's words, unchanged: CAPEC-673 at MITRE. CAPEC is Copyright © 2007–2026, The MITRE Corporation, used under the CAPEC terms of use: “The MITRE Corporation (MITRE) hereby grants you a non-exclusive, royalty-free license to use Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC™) for research, development, and commercial purposes. Any copy you make for such purposes is authorized provided that you reproduce MITRE’s copyright designation and this license in any such copy.” CAPEC and the CAPEC logo are trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Credits. All attack patterns.