CAPEC-672
Malicious Code Implanted During Chip Programming
During the programming step of chip manufacture, an adversary with access and necessary technical skills maliciously alters a chip’s intended program logic to produce an effect intended by the adversary when the fully manufactured chip is deployed and in operational use. Intended effects can include the ability of the adversary to remotely control a host system to carry out malicious acts.
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Explain the attack pattern CAPEC-672: Malicious Code Implanted During Chip Programming: how it unfolds, what it needs and how to prevent and detect it in my systems. Use https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/672.html and https://cve.bz/cve/capec/672?via=ask-ai-copy, which lists recent CVEs with the weaknesses it exploits. Cite the sources.Opens a third-party assistant; its answer is its own, not cve.bz's. The prompt holds only this attack pattern's id and public links.
Prerequisites
An adversary would need to have access to a foundry’s or chip maker’s development/production environment where programs for specific chips are developed, managed and uploaded into targeted chips prior to distribution or sale.
Skills required
- Medium skill
An adversary needs to be skilled in microprogramming, manipulation of configuration management systems, and in the operation of tools used for the uploading of programs into chips during manufacture. Uploading can be for individual chips or performed on a large scale basis.
Consequences
| Impact | Affects | Note |
|---|---|---|
| Alter Execution Logic | Integrity |
Mitigations
Utilize DMEA’s (Defense Microelectronics Activity) Trusted Foundry Program members for acquisition of microelectronic components.
Ensure that each supplier performing hardware development implements comprehensive, security-focused configuration management of microcode and microcode generating tools and software.
Require that provenance of COTS microelectronic components be known whenever procured.
Conduct detailed vendor assessment before acquiring COTS hardware.
Related attack patterns
- Part of
- CAPEC-444 Development Alteration
Examples
Following a chip’s production process steps of test and verification and validation of chip circuitry, an adv…
Following a chip’s production process steps of test and verification and validation of chip circuitry, an adversary involved in the generation of microcode defining the chip’s function(s) inserts a malicious instruction that will become part of the chip’s program. When integrated into a system, the chip will produce an effect intended by the adversary.
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