CAPEC-664
Server Side Request Forgery
An adversary exploits improper input validation by submitting maliciously crafted input to a target application running on a server, with the goal of forcing the server to make a request either to itself, to web services running in the server’s internal network, or to external third parties. If successful, the adversary’s request will be made with the server’s privilege level, bypassing its authentication controls. This ultimately allows the adversary to access sensitive data, execute commands on the server’s network, and make external requests with the stolen identity of the server. Server Side Request Forgery attacks differ from Cross Site Request Forgery attacks in that they target the server itself, whereas CSRF attacks exploit an insecure user authentication mechanism to perform unauthorized actions on the user's behalf.
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Explain the attack pattern CAPEC-664: Server Side Request Forgery: how it unfolds, what it needs and how to prevent and detect it in my systems. Use https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/664.html and https://cve.bz/cve/capec/664?via=ask-ai-copy, which lists recent CVEs with the weaknesses it exploits. Cite the sources.Opens a third-party assistant; its answer is its own, not cve.bz's. The prompt holds only this attack pattern's id and public links.
How the attack unfolds
Explore
The attacker looks for a way in.
[Find target application] Find target web application that accepts a user input and retrieves data from the server
Experiment
They probe what they found.
[Examine existing application requests] Examine HTTP/GET requests to view the URL query format. Adversaries test to see if this type of attack is possible through weaknesses in an application's protection to Server Side Request Forgery
3 techniques
- Attempt manipulating the URL to retrieve an error response/code from the server to determine if URL/request validation is done.
- Use a list of XSS probe strings to specify as parameters to known URLs. If possible, use probe strings with unique identifiers.
- Create a GET request with a common server file path such as /etc/passwd as a parameter and examine output.
Exploit
They carry out the attack.
[Malicious request] Adversary crafts a malicious URL request that assumes the privilege level of the server to query internal or external network services and sends the request to the application
Prerequisites
Server must be running a web application that processes HTTP requests.
Skills required
- Medium skill
The adversary will have to detect the vulnerability through an intermediary service or specify maliciously crafted URLs and analyze the server response.
- High skill
The adversary will be required to access internal resources, extract information, or leverage the services running on the server to perform unauthorized actions such as traversing the local network or routing a reflected TCP DDoS through them.
Resources required
[None] No specialized resources are required to execute this type of attack.
Consequences
| Impact | Affects | Note |
|---|---|---|
| Modify Data | Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability | |
| Read Data | Confidentiality | |
| Resource Consumption | Availability |
Mitigations
Handling incoming requests securely is the first line of action to mitigate this vulnerability. This can be done through URL validation.
Further down the process flow, examining the response and verifying that it is as expected before sending would be another way to secure the server.
Allowlist the DNS name or IP address of every service the web application is required to access is another effective security measure. This ensures the server cannot make external requests to arbitrary services.
Requiring authentication for local services adds another layer of security between the adversary and internal services running on the server. By enforcing local authentication, an adversary will not gain access to all internal services only with access to the server.
Enforce the usage of relevant URL schemas. By limiting requests be made only through HTTP or HTTPS, for example, attacks made through insecure schemas such as file://, ftp://, etc. can be prevented.
Weaknesses it exploits
Recent CVEs with these weaknesses
- 8.7CVE-2026-63651
LiveDocs is a primary-source-first documentation for AI agents. Prior to version 0.7.0, fetch_docs and introspect (kinds openapi/graphql, and resolve_source's docs_url) pass a client-supplied URL straight to URLSession with no scheme or ho…
- 9.6CVE-2026-108186
Improper Input Validation in Zoom Workplace for Windows may allow an unauthenticated user to conduct an escalation of privilege via network access.
- 4.9CVE-2026-105427
Improper input validation in Ivanti EPMM before version 12.10.0.1, 12.9.0.3, and 12.8.0.5 allows a remote authenticated attacker with admin privileges to permanently disable all Apache HTTPS services resulting in denial of service.
- 6.7CVE-2026-105426
Improper input validation in Ivanti EPMM before version 12.10.0.1, 12.9.0.3, and 12.8.0.5 allows a remote authenticated attacker with admin privileges to set arbitrary Linux kernel parameters as root.
- 4.3CVE-2026-123178
An insufficient input validation vulnerability in the listed NETGEAR Orbi Models router allows an authenticated administrator connected to the local network to execute unauthorized commands and modify the router’s software and functionalit…
- 6.3CVE-2026-125871
The sourcecache expansion module in MISP Modules (misp-modules) contains a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability. When a user with permission to create or modify attributes of type 'link' or 'url' submits an attribute value, the…
- 5.3CVE-2026-100962
NVIDIA NeMo Export-Deploy for all platforms contains a vulnerability in multimodal deployment where an attacker could cause a server-side request forgery. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might cause information disclosure.
- 5.5CVE-2026-125703
A flaw was found in the GStreamer gst-plugins-bad MXF plugin. Insufficient bounds checks when parsing crafted VANC data can cause an out-of-bounds read in the demuxer, while an incorrect buffer size calculation when muxing multiple ancilla…
The newest records naming one of them. Each weakness's page lists them all.
Related attack patterns
- Part of
- CAPEC-115 Authentication Bypass
Examples
An e-commerce website allows a customer to filter results by specific categories. When the customer selects t…
An e-commerce website allows a customer to filter results by specific categories. When the customer selects the category of choice, the web shop queries a back-end service to retrieve the requested products. The request may look something like:
POST /product/category HTTP/1.0
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 200
vulnerableService=http://vulnerableshop.net:8080/product/category/check%3FcategoryName%3DsomeCategory
A malicious user can modify the request URL to look like this instead:
POST /product/category HTTP/1.0
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 200
vulnerableService=http://localhost/server-status
or
vulnerableService = file:///etc/passwd
or
vulnerableService=dict://localhost:12345/info
If the exploit is successful, the server may return the data requested by the adversary
root:!:0:0::/:/usr/bin/ksh
daemon:!:1:1::/etc:
bin:!:2:2::/bin:
sys:!:3:3::/usr/sys:
adm:!:4:4::/var/adm:
uucp:!:5:5::/usr/lib/uucp:
guest:!:100:100::/home/guest:
nobody:!:4294967294:4294967294::/:
lpd:!:9:4294967294::/:
lp:*:11:11::/var/spool/lp:/bin/false
invscout:*:200:1::/var/adm/invscout:/usr/bin/ksh
nuucp:*:6:5:uucp login user:/var/spool/uucppublic:/usr/sbin/uucp/uucico
paul:!:201:1::/home/paul:/usr/bin/ksh
jdoe:*:202:1:My name:/home/myname:/usr/bin/ksh
The CallStranger attack is an observed example of SSRF. It specifically targets the UPnP (Universal Plug and …
The CallStranger attack is an observed example of SSRF. It specifically targets the UPnP (Universal Plug and Play) protocol used by various network devices and gaming consoles. To execute the attack, an adversary performs a scan of the LAN to discover UPnP enabled devices, and subsequently a list of UPnP services they use. Once the UPnP service endpoints are listed, a vulnerability in the UPnP protocol is used to send these endpoints as encrypted to a verification server via the UPnP Callback method. Because the encryption is done on the client side, the server returns an encrypted list of services which is decrypted on the client side. The adversary then has a list of services running the vulnerable UPnP protocol, which the adversary can leverage to make spoofed requests. [REF-646]
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