CVSS 3.1
7.8 highCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HHigh (7.8). EPSS 0.2% estimated probability of exploitation activity in the next 30 days.
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HExplain CVE-2026-95168 for an engineer deciding whether to act. Use https://cve.bz/api/public/cves/CVE-2026-95168?via=ask-ai-copy and https://cve.bz/cve/CVE-2026-95168?via=ask-ai-copy as the source of truth: what is affected and which versions fix it, whether it is in CISA KEV, public exploits, and its EPSS (an internet-wide 30-day estimate of exploitation activity, not a forecast for my systems). If they give no fixed versions, use the CVE record https://cveawg.mitre.org/api/cve/CVE-2026-95168 or the vendor advisory, not third-party mirrors. Tell me how to check whether I am affected and how to verify a fix. Cite the sources and say where they are uncertain.Opens a third-party assistant; its answer is its own, not cve.bz's. The prompt holds only this CVE's id and public links.
| Distribution | Release | Package | Fixed in | Advisory |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debian | 12, 13, 14 | thefuck | no fix listed | DEBIAN-CVE-2026-95168 |
| Ubuntu | 16.04:LTS, 18.04:LTS, 20.04:LTS and 4 more | thefuck | no fix listed | UBUNTU-CVE-2026-95168 |
From the distributions' data via OSV.dev: the Debian Security Tracker; Ubuntu Security Notices © Canonical Ltd., CC BY-SA 4.0. Modified: reformatted and linked to CVE records. Credits. On the distributions' own pages: Debian · Ubuntu.
Red Hat rates this Important.
This vulnerability is rated as an Important severity because it enables an unprivileged local attacker to achieve arbitrary code execution in the context of the user running the utility, provided the user interacts with a specially crafted environment. The thefuck package is not shipped in Red Hat Enterprise Linux and is only distributed through community repositories such as Fedora and EPEL. Systems running standard Red Hat Enterprise Linux installations are therefore not impacted by this flaw.
Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.
--- CME Mitigation Guidance (2026-10-20) ---
Disclaimer: The following mitigation solutions are provided as a courtesy, pending the application of an official patch. This content was generated utilizing AI tools in conjunction with data from https://cmetaxonomy.org. Customers are advised to independently evaluate and test these temporary mitigations within their own infrastructure.
The highest-value action is to eliminate automatic discovery and top-level code execution of rule modules from untrusted sys.path directories in thefuck prior to enablement gating: upgrade to the fixed Thefuck builds, which restrict loading third-party rules to directories not writable by other users, closing planting a crafted thefuck_contrib_* package in a writable sys.path directory. Until patched, this is only a concern on Linux systems where multiple users share Python environments or where sys.path directories are writable by untrusted users — Standard Red Hat Enterprise Linux installations without Fedora or EPEL packages are unaffected — so Audit and restrict write permissions across all directories in sys.path, shared virtual environments, and group-writable site-packages to prevent untrusted users from placing files. As a compensating measure, Audit process spawn and file access events via auditd when rule modules in sys.path are loaded and executed, Enforce SELinux in enforcing mode with confined user mappings to bound execution privileges and restrict unauthorized operations, Restrict filesystem access paths via Landlock LSM sandboxing to prevent reading or importing from untrusted writable directories, Isolate filesystem mount namespaces to prevent the application from resolving modules planted in shared or world-writable directories, Deploy endpoint detection and response agents to detect anomalous child process execution or suspicious behavioral activity during rule import, and Monitor kernel syscall activity using Falco or eBPF runtime security to detect unexpected process spawns from imported rules. These controls limit blast radius and contain exploitation, but they do not fix the underlying insecure rule loading defect — apply the upstream patch to fully remediate.
Highest-impact CME: CME-301 SELinux (Enforcing Mode) (medium)
Contains Red Hat Security Data © Red Hat, Inc., licensed under CC BY 4.0. Source: https://access.redhat.com/security/data. Modified: reformatted. Red Hat's page for CVE-2026-95168.
The attack patterns MITRE's CAPEC relates to this record's weaknesses, as MITRE names them. Credits.