CVE-2026-89617
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: validate dirty page table on log replay Each DIR_PAGE_ENTRY ends in a page_lcns[] array whose length is the on-disk lcns_follow field. check_rstbl() validates the table bookkeeping but never checks that this array fits in the entry, so a crafted lcns_follow lets the v0->v1 conversion memmove and later replay passes run off the entry. Add check_dp_table() to reject, right after check_rstbl(), any entry larger than its size claims via struct_size() (the same expression used to allocate these entries, so the check is overflow-safe by construction). All consumers can then trust lcns_follow as the real capacity. This covers every page_lcns[] access whose index is bounded by the entry itself (the conversion memmove, the HotFix store via find_dp(), and the self-bounded scan loops). Accesses whose index comes from the log record need a separate bound and are handled in a follow-up patch.
- CVSS 3.1
- 7.8
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - EPSS
- 0.1% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days; higher than 3% of CVEs (scores of 2026-10-25)
- Published
- Modified
- Record from
- the NVD, synced
References
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/006cb7713dec10368e699abc4367e5faa334c9a5
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0908da07c23be4f94b99dfd9a94765525f0fe4bd
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0e07ea2fc45a7b4757ef7bf1f692cc0180a08323
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1200c2779c43b62656ccbb67df9468a7a9af2484
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1e90b1703ee1a04cd3e9e399353fc536f5f3ba10