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CVE-2026-78164 apache software foundation apache camel

8.2 highEPSS 0.3%

High (8.2) in apache software foundation apache camel. EPSS 0.3% estimated probability of exploitation activity in the next 30 days.

On this page
Improper Neutralization of Special Elements Used in a Template Engine and Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor vulnerability in Apache Camel HTTP, Netty HTTP, Undertow and Vert.x HTTP components. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.1. The Camel HTTP producer families let an inbound message override the endpoint URI through the CamelHttpUri and CamelRestHttpUri headers, and then passed that message-supplied string through CamelContext.resolvePropertyPlaceholders() before using it. Property-placeholder resolution is a configuration-resolution facility, not a URI-parsing step: it reaches operating-system environment variables, JVM system properties, every PropertiesFunction registered on the classpath - including the secret functions - and, through camel-bean, the invocation of a no-argument method on any bean in the registry. Applying it to Exchange content therefore turned a URI string into a configuration- and bean-evaluation context. A route author opted into none of this: a plain static to("http://backend/api") was sufficient. Seven call sites were affected: HttpHelper.createURL and HttpHelper.createMethod in camel-http-common, HttpMethodHelper.createMethod in camel-http, VertxHttpHelper.resolveHttpURI in camel-vertx-http, UndertowHelper.createURL and UndertowHelper.createMethod in camel-undertow, and NettyHttpHelper.createURL in camel-netty-http. The bridgeEndpoint option did not bound the exposure: it suppresses the CamelHttpUri override in the createURL family but not in the createMethod family, so a route using the documented bridging configuration still resolved placeholders taken from the header, and CamelRestHttpUri was consumed before any bridgeEndpoint check in all four components. Only camel-http offered an opt-out, skipControlHeaders, which defaults to false. Reaching the headers did not always require header injection, because several Camel HTTP consumers populate CamelHttpUri from the request line themselves as a documented reverse-proxy feature. An unresolvable placeholder additionally produced a RuntimeExchangeException whose message echoed the URI, which distinguishes a set from an unset configuration key even where no outbound request is made. The behaviour predates the 4.x line. This advisory continues the alignment CAMEL-24282 applied to the toD and enrich dynamic-URI EIPs in 4.22.0, extending the same build-time-resolution contract to the HTTP producer components. Users should upgrade to version 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. Users on the 4.22.x releases stream should upgrade to 4.22.1. Users on the 4.18.x releases stream should upgrade to 4.18.5. The 4.14.x releases stream and earlier reached end of life before this issue was resolved and will not receive a fix, so deployments on those lines must move to a supported release. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the override headers at the trust boundary before the producer with removeHeader("CamelHttpUri") and removeHeader("CamelRestHttpUri"), or set skipControlHeaders=true on camel-http endpoints, which is the only component offering that option. Note that bridgeEndpoint=true is not a workaround: it suppresses the header override when the outbound URL is built but not when the header is re-parsed for the query string. Percent-encoding the placeholder delimiters is likewise not a mitigation for camel-netty-http, whose binding decodes the request path before the value reaches the header, so proxy or WAF rules written against the raw delimiters do not help there. As defence in depth, ensure consumers exposed to untrusted senders apply a strict inbound HeaderFilterStrategy over the Camel namespace, and resolve secrets through a vault rather than through environment variables or system properties that a placeholder can name.

Severity

CVSS 3.1

8.2 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N
EPSS
0.3% (unchanged from 0.3% a week ago) estimated probability of exploitation activity in the next 30 days; 28th percentile. Scored 2026-11-17. A forecast for this CVE across the internet, not for your own systems.
CISA's assessment (SSVC)
Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: partial, assessed 2026-10-19. From CISA's Vulnrichment in the CVE List: whether it is exploited, whether exploiting it can be automated, and how much control it gives.
CWEs
CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
CWE-1336 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements Used in a Template Engine
OWASP Top 10
A01:2025 Broken Access Control
Published
Modified
NVD analysis
Under analysis
Record from
the NVD, synced

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Affected

  • apache software foundation:apache camel

Versions

From the CNA's record in the CVE List.

ProductAffected
Apache Software Foundation Apache Camelfrom 4.0.0 before 4.18.5
Apache Software Foundation Apache Camelfrom 4.19.0 before 4.22.1
Apache Software Foundation Apache Camelfrom 4.15.0 before 4.18.5

Red Hat

Red Hat rates this Important.

Red Hat's statement

This vulnerability is rated Important rather than Moderate because remote, unauthenticated attackers can exfiltrate sensitive credentials and application configuration without requiring prior access or administrative privileges. In Red Hat integration environments, Camel routes utilizing HTTP producer components propagate request metadata that may automatically resolve internal property placeholders. Consequently, external requests directed at standard reverse-proxy or bridging endpoints can expose backend secrets or invoke local bean operations across affected Apache Camel runtimes.

Red Hat's mitigation

--- CME Mitigation Guidance (2026-10-20) ---

Disclaimer: The following mitigation solutions are provided as a courtesy, pending the application of an official patch. This content was generated utilizing AI tools in conjunction with data from https://cmetaxonomy.org. Customers are advised to independently evaluate and test these temporary mitigations within their own infrastructure.

The highest-value action is to eliminate property placeholder resolution on message-supplied URI override headers in Apache Camel HTTP producer components: upgrade to Apache Camel 4.18.5, 4.22.1, or 4.23.0 (or the fixed Camel Http Common/Camel Http/Camel Vertx Http/Camel Undertow/Camel Netty Http builds), which remove property placeholder resolution on message-supplied URI override headers across HTTP producer helper methods, closing all 3 injection vectors (property placeholder injection via CamelHttpUri header, property placeholder injection via CamelRestHttpUri header, request-line placeholder injection via reverse-proxy consumers). Until patched, this is a concern on deployments using Apache Camel HTTP producer components handling untrusted message exchanges, so strip CamelHttpUri and CamelRestHttpUri headers at trust boundaries prior to routing to HTTP producers, or configure skipControlHeaders=true on camel-http endpoints. As a compensating measure, apply allowlist validation to inbound headers or strip unexpected control headers such as CamelHttpUri before message exchanges reach HTTP producers. These controls limit blast radius and contain exploitation, but they do not fix the underlying improper property placeholder evaluation defect — apply the upstream patch to fully remediate.

Highest-impact CME: CME-1309 Script Engine Restriction (Sandbox / Disable) (high)

ProductPackageStateAdvisory
Red Hat build of Apache Camel 4 for Quarkus 3camel-httpAffected
Red Hat build of Apache Camel 4 for Quarkus 3camel-http-commonAffected
Red Hat build of Apache Camel 4 for Quarkus 3camel-netty-httpAffected
Red Hat build of Apache Camel 4 for Quarkus 3camel-vertx-httpAffected
Red Hat build of Apache Camel for Spring Boot 4camel-httpAffected
Red Hat build of Apache Camel for Spring Boot 4camel-http-commonAffected
Red Hat build of Apache Camel for Spring Boot 4camel-netty-httpAffected
Red Hat build of Apache Camel for Spring Boot 4camel-undertowAffected
Red Hat build of Apache Camel for Spring Boot 4camel-vertx-httpAffected
Red Hat Fuse 7camel-httpAffected
Red Hat Fuse 7camel-http-commonAffected
Red Hat Fuse 7camel-netty-httpAffected
Red Hat Fuse 7camel-undertowAffected

Contains Red Hat Security Data © Red Hat, Inc., licensed under CC BY 4.0. Source: https://access.redhat.com/security/data. Modified: reformatted. Red Hat's page for CVE-2026-78164.

GitHub PoC

Repositories on GitHub named after this CVE or listed for it by the PoC-in-GitHub index. For those marked Harbor Check: matches CVE, Flawharbor read the code and found it implements this CVE's exploitation technique: read, not run, and its dependencies only checked for warning signs, so a pointer and no guarantee. The rest are unverified: some hold a working proof of concept, some nothing useful, and some malware made to look like one. Read the code before you run any of it. How Harbor Check reads them, and what it found.

  • oscerd/CVE-2026-78164 Harbor Check: matches CVE 0 stars, Java, created
    Reproducer for CVE-2026-78164 (Apache Camel HTTP producers): property placeholders resolved on the message-supplied CamelHttpUri/CamelRestH…

Attack patterns (CAPEC)

The attack patterns MITRE's CAPEC relates to this record's weaknesses, as MITRE names them. Credits. More on the page of CWE-200 (59).

References

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