CVE-2026-72889
Net::OAuth versions before 0.33 for Perl allow the sender to choose the signature algorithm in verify. verify resolves the signature method class from the signature_method parameter of the incoming message. signature_method is required on every request, so the algorithm used to check a signature is chosen by whoever sent it, and nothing lets the verifying party pin the method instead. When a message names HMAC-SHA1 or HMAC-SHA256, the key is derived from consumer_secret and token_secret rather than from the key the provider deployed. A provider deployed on RSA-SHA1 holds only the consumer public key, and RFC 5849 does not use consumer_secret for that method, so the required parameter is filled with a placeholder. A client that names HMAC-SHA1 instead has its signature checked against that placeholder, so a guessable one is enough to forge requests for any consumer key and token.
- CVSS 3.1
- 9.8
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - EPSS
- 0.4% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days; higher than 38% of CVEs (scores of 2026-10-26)
- CWEs
- CWE-347, CWE-757
- Published
- Modified
- Record from
- the NVD, synced
References
- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5849#section-3.4.2
- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5849#section-3.4.3
- https://github.com/vurtdev/Net-OAuth/commit/c467adf45c8d77ac4b92ad78b3eebf949252ba7f.patch
- https://github.com/vurtdev/Net-OAuth/security/advisories/GHSA-c8rm-g5cm-4pf5
- https://metacpan.org/release/RRWO/Net-OAuth-0.33/changes