CVSS 3.1
9.8 criticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HCritical (9.8) in apache software foundation apache johnzon. EPSS 0.4% estimated probability of exploitation activity in the next 30 days.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HExplain CVE-2026-71253 for an engineer deciding whether to act. Use https://cve.bz/api/public/cves/CVE-2026-71253?via=ask-ai-copy and https://cve.bz/cve/CVE-2026-71253?via=ask-ai-copy as the source of truth: what is affected and which versions fix it, whether it is in CISA KEV, public exploits, and its EPSS (an internet-wide 30-day estimate of exploitation activity, not a forecast for my systems). If they give no fixed versions, use the CVE record https://cveawg.mitre.org/api/cve/CVE-2026-71253 or the vendor advisory, not third-party mirrors. Tell me how to check whether I am affected and how to verify a fix. Cite the sources and say where they are uncertain.Opens a third-party assistant; its answer is its own, not cve.bz's. The prompt holds only this CVE's id and public links.
From the CNA's record in the CVE List.
| Product | Affected |
|---|---|
| Apache Software Foundation Apache Johnzon | from 2.0.0 before 2.2.0 |
| Apache Software Foundation Apache Johnzon | from 1.0.0 before 1.3.1 |
Red Hat rates this Important.
This vulnerability is rated as having an Important severity because unauthenticated remote actors can achieve arbitrary code execution when untrusted data triggers class initialization within the JVM, representing a high impact on system integrity and confidentiality. In enterprise integration environments such as Red Hat JBoss Fuse where Apache Johnzon processes external payloads, risk is constrained by whether deployed services map untrusted input into Class-typed fields. Exploitation requires both an endpoint bound to class representations and the presence of exploitable gadget classes on the application classpath.
--- CME Mitigation Guidance (2026-10-20) ---
The highest-value action is to restrict class loading during JSON deserialization to an explicit permit-list of safe types when deserializing into java.lang.Class fields in Johnzon Mapper: upgrade to Apache Johnzon 1.3.1 or 2.2.0 (or the fixed Johnzon Mapper builds), which restrict and guard class deserialization in ClassConverter and LazyConverterMap against loading arbitrary class names, closing crafted JSON payload containing an arbitrary class name targeting a Class-typed field. Until patched, this is a concern on applications deserializing untrusted JSON payloads into object models containing java.lang.Class typed fields, so avoid deserializing untrusted JSON into object models containing java.lang.Class fields and audit the classpath to eliminate classes with dangerous static initializers or gadget chains. As a compensating measure, enforce strict permit-list validation on incoming class name strings rather than relying on denylists to prevent arbitrary class resolution. These controls limit blast radius and contain exploitation, but they do not fix the underlying unsafe dynamic class loading defect — apply the upstream patch to fully remediate.
Highest-impact CME: CME-1302 Deserialization Allowlist (Safe Loading) (high)
Disclaimer: The following mitigation solutions are provided as a courtesy, pending the application of an official patch. This content was generated utilizing AI tools in conjunction with data from cmetaxonomy.org. Customers are advised to independently evaluate and test these temporary mitigations within their own infrastructure.
| Product | Package | State | Advisory |
|---|---|---|---|
| Red Hat Fuse 7 | johnzon-mapper | Out of support scope |
Contains Red Hat Security Data © Red Hat, Inc., licensed under CC BY 4.0. Source: https://access.redhat.com/security/data. Modified: reformatted. Red Hat's page for CVE-2026-71253.
The attack patterns MITRE's CAPEC relates to this record's weaknesses, as MITRE names them. Credits.