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CVE-2026-64855 soapbar: verify_envelope_bsp accepts an unauthenticated embedded certificate (signature forgery / authentication bypass)

8.2 highEPSS 0.2%

High (8.2) in hitoshyamamoto soapbar. EPSS 0.2% estimated probability of exploitation activity in the next 30 days.

On this page
soapbar is a SOAP library for Python — client, server, and WSDL handling. Prior to version 0.13.0, verify_envelope_bsp() derived its trust anchor from the message it was verifying. It read the X.509 certificate out of the caller-untrusted wsse:BinarySecurityToken, validated only that certificate's not-before / not-after dates, and then verified the signature against that same certificate. There was no CA-chain validation, no issuer/subject allowlist, and no pinning. A successful verify_envelope_bsp() therefore proved only that the envelope was signed by whoever supplied the embedded certificate — never that it was signed by a trusted party. An attacker who mints their own certificate, signs a forged envelope, and embeds that certificate in the token passes verification. Any consumer that treats a successful BSP verification as authentication can be impersonated (signature forgery / authentication bypass). verify_envelope() (which pins a caller-supplied x509_cert) was not affected — the flaw was specific to the BSP variant whose trust anchor came from the message. This issue has been patched in version 0.13.0.

Severity

CVSS 3.1

8.2 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N
EPSS
0.2% estimated probability of exploitation activity in the next 30 days; 9th percentile. Scored 2026-11-13. A forecast for this CVE across the internet, not for your own systems.
CISA's assessment (SSVC)
Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: partial, assessed 2026-11-12. From CISA's Vulnrichment in the CVE List: whether it is exploited, whether exploiting it can be automated, and how much control it gives.
CWEs
CWE-295 Improper Certificate Validation
CWE-347 Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature
OWASP Top 10
A04:2025 Cryptographic Failures, A07:2025 Authentication Failures
Published
Modified
Assigned by
GitHub_M (CNA)
NVD analysis
Deferred: the NVD does not plan to analyze it
Record from
the NVD, synced

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Affected

Versions

From the CNA's record in the CVE List.

ProductAffected
hitoshyamamoto soapbar< 0.13.0

Attack patterns (CAPEC)

  • CAPEC-459 Creating a Rogue Certification Authority Certificate Likelihood: Medium · Severity: Very High
  • CAPEC-475 Signature Spoofing by Improper Validation Likelihood: Low · Severity: High
  • CAPEC-463 Padding Oracle Crypto Attack Severity: High

The attack patterns MITRE's CAPEC relates to this record's weaknesses, as MITRE names them. Credits.

History

  1. The NVD deferred its analysis

Changes since this site first stored the record. The same for every record: /api/public/changes.

References

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