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CVE-2026-62949 ronf asyncssh: Infinite Loop

6.5 mediumEPSS 0.4%Fix available

Medium (6.5) in ronf asyncssh. EPSS 0.4% estimated probability of exploitation activity in the next 30 days. Fixed in asyncssh 2.24.0.

On this page
AsyncSSH is a Python package which provides an asynchronous client and server implementation of the SSHv2 protocol on top of the Python asyncio framework. Prior to 2.24.0, _process_channel_open and _process_channel_open_confirmation in asyncssh/connection.py accept a peer-supplied send_pktsize value of zero. When channel data reaches SSHChannel._flush_send_buf in asyncssh/channel.py, the zero value causes each loop iteration to slice and remove zero bytes without reducing the send window, leaving the synchronous loop permanently true with no await point. A malicious SSH server can trigger the client path through SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION before the first channel write, while an authenticated client can trigger the server path through SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN and freeze every current and future connection handled by the process. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.24.0.

Severity

CVSS 3.1

6.5 medium
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
EPSS
0.4% (unchanged from 0.4% a week ago; 0.4% 30 days ago) estimated probability of exploitation activity in the next 30 days; 34th percentile. Scored 2026-11-17. A forecast for this CVE across the internet, not for your own systems.
CISA's assessment (SSVC)
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial, assessed 2026-09-17. From CISA's Vulnrichment in the CVE List: whether it is exploited, whether exploiting it can be automated, and how much control it gives.
CWE
CWE-835 Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition (Infinite Loop)
Published
Modified
NVD analysis
Awaiting analysis
Record from
the NVD, synced

Fix and patched versions

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Affected

Versions

From the CNA's record in the CVE List.

ProductAffected
ronf asyncssh< 2.24.0

Packages (OSV)

AdvisoryEcosystemPackageAffectedFixed in
GHSA-rw4j-r22c-9gc3PyPIasyncssh<2.24.02.24.0
PYSEC-2026-4026PyPIasyncssh<2.24.02.24.0

Linux distributions

DistributionReleasePackageFixed inAdvisory
Debian12, 13, 14python-asyncsshno fix listedDEBIAN-CVE-2026-62949
Ubuntu16.04:LTS, 20.04:LTS, 26.04:LTS and 4 morepython-asyncsshno fix listedUBUNTU-CVE-2026-62949
openSUSELeap 16.0python-asyncssh2.21.0-bp160.2.1openSUSE-SU-2026:21953-1
openSUSETumbleweedpython-asyncssh2.24.0-1.1openSUSE-SU-2026:11851-1

From the distributions' data via OSV.dev: the Debian Security Tracker; Ubuntu Security Notices © Canonical Ltd., CC BY-SA 4.0; SUSE security data, CC BY 4.0. Modified: reformatted and linked to CVE records. Credits. On the distributions' own pages: Debian · Ubuntu · openSUSE.

Red Hat

Red Hat rates this Moderate.

Red Hat's statement

A denial of service vulnerability was found in AsyncSSH, a Python asynchronous SSHv2 client and server implementation. Prior to version 2.24.0, the _process_channel_open and _process_channel_open_confirmation functions in asyncssh/connection.py accept a peer supplied send_pktsize value of zero. When channel data is processed by SSHChannel._flush_send_buf in asyncssh/channel.py, the zero value causes an infinite loop where each iteration attempts to slice and remove zero bytes without reducing the send window, leaving the synchronous loop permanently active with no await point. A malicious SSH server can trigger the client path through SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION before the first channel write, while an authenticated client can trigger the server path through SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN, freezing the entire asyncio event loop and rendering all current and future connections handled by the process unresponsive. This issue affects Red Hat Ceph Storage components that use vulnerable versions of asyncssh. The issue is fixed in asyncssh 2.24.0.

Red Hat's mitigation

Until updates are available, administrators can implement the following mitigations to reduce the risk of event loop freeze attacks:

1. Restrict SSH connectivity for Ceph management and orchestration tools to trusted SSH servers only. Use firewall rules or network policies to prevent connections to untrusted or internet-exposed SSH servers.

2. If using asyncssh-based SSH servers, implement authentication and connection rate limiting to prevent abuse from authenticated attackers attempting to freeze the service.

3. Monitor Ceph management processes for unexpected hangs or unresponsive behavior, and implement automated health checks that can detect and restart frozen processes.

4. Consider using OpenSSH instead of asyncssh for critical management operations where feasible, as OpenSSH is not affected by this vulnerability.

5. For automation scripts using asyncssh, implement connection timeouts and process monitoring to detect and recover from hung connections.

Apply updates as they become available from Red Hat product teams.

ProductPackageStateAdvisory
Red Hat Ceph Storage 7rhceph/rhceph-7-rhel9Fix deferred
Red Hat Ceph Storage 8rhceph/rhceph-8-rhel9Fix deferred
Red Hat Ceph Storage 9rhceph/rhceph-9-rhel9Fix deferred

Contains Red Hat Security Data © Red Hat, Inc., licensed under CC BY 4.0. Source: https://access.redhat.com/security/data. Modified: reformatted. Red Hat's page for CVE-2026-62949.

References

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