CVE-2026-57142

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From version 4.5.87 to before version 4.6.61, PraisonAI recipe execution has a dangerous-tool policy that is supposed to block default-denied tools unless the caller explicitly passes allow_dangerous_tools=True. That policy only checks tools declared in TEMPLATE.yaml requires.tools. For steps-based recipes, the actual execution path loads workflow.yaml with YAMLWorkflowParser. That parser resolves agent-level tools: declarations and preserves top-level approve:. Workflow.start() then installs those YAML-approved tools into the approval context. As a result, an untrusted recipe can omit execute_command from TEMPLATE.yaml requires.tools, declare it in workflow.yaml agents.*.tools, and add top-level approve: [execute_command]. The caller did not set allow_dangerous_tools=True, but the recipe policy allows the recipe and the workflow approval path self-approves the critical shell tool. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.61.

CVSS 3.1

7.8CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

EPSS

0.1% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days; higher than 3% of CVEs (scores of 2026-10-25)

CWEs

CWE-78, CWE-94, CWE-863

Published

2026-10-23

Modified

2026-10-23

Record from

the NVD, synced 2026-10-23

Packages (OSV)

References

• https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-7qw2-w5rc-37x2

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