Runtipi is a personal homeserver orchestrator. In 4.10.0 and earlier, Runtipi accepts symbolic links from an attacker-controlled backup archive and copies them into live application paths during the backup restore flow. An authenticated attacker can plant user-config/app.env as a symlink to an arbitrary reachable path and then send PUT /api/user-config/demoapp3:_user with attacker-controlled appEnv content. FilesystemService.writeTextFile() follows the planted link, allowing content to be written outside the intended restore and user-config directory boundary with Runtipi process permissions. This issue is fixed in version 4.10.1.
Severity
CVSS 3.1
6.5 medium
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
EPSS
0.6%(unchanged from 0.6% a week ago; 0.6% 30 days ago) estimated probability of exploitation activity in the next 30 days; 50th percentile. Scored 2026-11-17. A forecast for this CVE across the internet, not for your own systems.
CISA's assessment (SSVC)
Exploitation: PoC · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total, assessed 2026-08-25. From CISA's Vulnrichment in the CVE List: whether it is exploited, whether exploiting it can be automated, and how much control it gives.
CWEs
CWE-59Improper Link Resolution Before File Access (Link Following) CWE-61UNIX Symbolic Link (Symlink) Following
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Repositories on GitHub named after this CVE or listed for it by the PoC-in-GitHub index. For those marked Harbor Check: matches CVE, Flawharbor read the code and found it implements this CVE's exploitation technique: read, not run, and its dependencies only checked for warning signs, so a pointer and no guarantee. The rest are unverified: some hold a working proof of concept, some nothing useful, and some malware made to look like one. Read the code before you run any of it. How Harbor Check reads them, and what it found.