Medium (6.5) in apache camel. EPSS 0.7% estimated probability of exploitation activity in the next 30 days. Fixed in org.apache.camel:camel-irc 4.14.8, 4.18.3, 4.21.0.
Improper Input Validation, Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection') vulnerability in Apache Camel IRC component.
The camel-irc producer chooses the destination of an outgoing IRC message from the irc.sendTo Exchange header (the constant IrcConstants.IRC_SEND_TO, value irc.sendTo); when that header is present it overrides the channel list configured on the endpoint, and the message is sent only to the specified destination. This and the component's other control headers (irc.target, irc.messageType, irc.user.*, irc.num, irc.value) used plain, non-Camel-prefixed values. Because these names do not start with the Camel / camel prefix, HttpHeaderFilterStrategy - which blocks only the Camel header namespace on the HTTP boundary - let them pass from an inbound HTTP request straight into the Exchange. In a route that bridges an HTTP consumer (for example platform-http) into an irc: producer, any HTTP client could therefore set the irc.sendTo header and redirect a message that the route intended for a configured channel to an arbitrary IRC channel or user - exfiltrating the message content to an attacker-chosen nickname, leaking it into a public channel, or delivering messages that appear to come from the bot. No credentials are required when the bridging consumer is unauthenticated.
This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. After upgrading, routes that set IRC headers via the raw header names must use the CamelIrc* names (for example CamelIrcSendTo) instead of the old irc.* values. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the irc.* headers from any untrusted ingress before the irc: producer (for example removeHeaders('irc.*') at the start of the route), and set the IRC destination from a trusted source.
Severity
CVSS 3.1
6.5 medium
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
EPSS
0.7%(unchanged from 0.7% a week ago; 0.7% 30 days ago) estimated probability of exploitation activity in the next 30 days; 53rd percentile. Scored 2026-11-15. A forecast for this CVE across the internet, not for your own systems.
CISA's assessment (SSVC)
Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: partial, assessed 2026-07-06. From CISA's Vulnrichment in the CVE List: whether it is exploited, whether exploiting it can be automated, and how much control it gives.
CWEs
CWE-20Improper Input Validation CWE-74Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component (Injection)
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Repositories on GitHub named after this CVE or listed for it by the PoC-in-GitHub index. For those marked Harbor Check: matches CVE, Flawharbor read the code and found it implements this CVE's exploitation technique: read, not run, and its dependencies only checked for warning signs, so a pointer and no guarantee. The rest are unverified: some hold a working proof of concept, some nothing useful, and some malware made to look like one. Read the code before you run any of it.
oscerd/CVE-2026-49097Harbor Check: matches CVE0 stars, Java, created PoC reproducer for CVE-2026-49097 (Apache Camel camel-irc): the non-Camel-prefixed irc.sendTo header escapes the HTTP header filter and ove…
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
The attack patterns MITRE's CAPEC relates to this record's weaknesses, as MITRE names them. Credits. More on the page of CWE-74 (37), CWE-20 (51).