CVE-2026-31700
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/packet: fix TOCTOU race on mmap'd vnet_hdr in tpacket_snd() In tpacket_snd(), when PACKET_VNET_HDR is enabled, vnet_hdr points directly into the mmap'd TX ring buffer shared with userspace. The kernel validates the header via __packet_snd_vnet_parse() but then re-reads all fields later in virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(). A concurrent userspace thread can modify the vnet_hdr fields between validation and use, bypassing all safety checks. The non-TPACKET path (packet_snd()) already correctly copies vnet_hdr to a stack-local variable. All other vnet_hdr consumers in the kernel (tun.c, tap.c, virtio_net.c) also use stack copies. The TPACKET TX path is the only caller of virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() that reads directly from user-controlled shared memory. Fix this by copying vnet_hdr from the mmap'd ring buffer to a stack-local variable before validation and use, consistent with the approach used in packet_snd() and all other callers.
- CVSS 3.1
- 7.8
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - EPSS
- 0.1% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days; higher than 1% of CVEs (scores of 2026-10-25)
- CWEs
- CWE-362, CWE-367
- Published
- Modified
- Record from
- the NVD, synced
Affected
- linux:linux_kernel
References
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0f4c9754956b86de158a4af5278c5cf5bda9439e
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1490f82353bdabc09265a74e645b07f05cf4188e
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/28324a3b62d9ce7f9bdd65a8ce63f382041d1b27
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2c054e17d9d41f1020376806c7f750834ced4dc5
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3a1bf9116ea31470b89692585c3910dfe830dcdd