The MASTER_PASSWORD_HOOK setting, introduced in pgAdmin 4 7.2, lets an administrator configure an external command that returns a per-user encryption key, with %u in the configured string replaced by the current user's name. The previous implementation substituted the username directly into the command string and executed the result with subprocess.Popen(..., shell=True). Because the username can originate from an external authentication source (OAuth/OIDC claims, Kerberos, webserver auth) rather than a value pgAdmin fully controls, a username containing shell metacharacters (';', '$()', backticks, pipes, '&&', newlines) allowed an authenticated user to execute arbitrary commands as the pgAdmin service account in any deployment where the configured hook string uses %u.
Fix tokenises the trusted, administrator-configured hook string into an argument vector first (using shlex in POSIX-quoting mode, with backslash-escaping disabled so Windows-style paths are not mis-parsed), substitutes the untrusted username into the individual argv elements, and executes with shell=False. The username is therefore always confined to a single argv element; any shell metacharacters it contains are inert. Administrators whose MASTER_PASSWORD_HOOK previously relied on shell features (pipes, redirection, environment-variable expansion, globbing) within the hook string itself must move that logic into the invoked script, since it is no longer interpreted by a shell.
This issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 7.2 before 9.17.
0.7%(unchanged from 0.7% a week ago; 0.7% 30 days ago) estimated probability of exploitation activity in the next 30 days; 54th percentile. Scored 2026-11-17. A forecast for this CVE across the internet, not for your own systems.
CISA's assessment (SSVC)
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total, assessed 2026-07-31. From CISA's Vulnrichment in the CVE List: whether it is exploited, whether exploiting it can be automated, and how much control it gives.
CWEs
CWE-78Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command (OS Command Injection) CWE-88Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command (Argument Injection)
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From the distributions' data via OSV.dev: SUSE security data, CC BY 4.0. Modified: reformatted and linked to CVE records. Credits. On the distributions' own pages: openSUSE.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
CAPEC-6 Argument Injection Likelihood: High · Severity: High
CAPEC-15 Command Delimiters Likelihood: High · Severity: High
CAPEC-43 Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers Likelihood: Medium · Severity: High
CAPEC-88 OS Command Injection Likelihood: High · Severity: High
CAPEC-108 Command Line Execution through SQL Injection Likelihood: Low · Severity: Very High
CAPEC-41 Using Meta-characters in E-mail Headers to Inject Malicious Payloads Likelihood: High · Severity: High
CAPEC-137 Parameter Injection Likelihood: Medium · Severity: Medium
CAPEC-174 Flash Parameter Injection Likelihood: High · Severity: Medium
CAPEC-460 HTTP Parameter Pollution (HPP) Severity: Medium
The attack patterns MITRE's CAPEC relates to this record's weaknesses, as MITRE names them. Credits.