CVSS 3.1
7.4 highCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HHigh (7.4). EPSS 0.10% estimated probability of exploitation activity in the next 30 days.
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HExplain CVE-2026-16460 for an engineer deciding whether to act. Use https://cve.bz/api/public/cves/CVE-2026-16460?via=ask-ai-copy and https://cve.bz/cve/CVE-2026-16460?via=ask-ai-copy as the source of truth: what is affected and which versions fix it, whether it is in CISA KEV, public exploits, and its EPSS (an internet-wide 30-day estimate of exploitation activity, not a forecast for my systems). If they give no fixed versions, use the CVE record https://cveawg.mitre.org/api/cve/CVE-2026-16460 or the vendor advisory, not third-party mirrors. Tell me how to check whether I am affected and how to verify a fix. Cite the sources and say where they are uncertain.Opens a third-party assistant; its answer is its own, not cve.bz's. The prompt holds only this CVE's id and public links.
Red Hat rates this Important.
Container signature policy gates pull and import of bootc images, but does not revalidate content that is already staged for the next boot. Tightening /etc/containers/policy.json alone does not invalidate previously staged deployments; those deployments can still be finalized by ordinary reboot or by apply paths that unlock already-staged content. This issue is distinct from, and compositionally related to, the mutable-tag / default-policy. Systems that never stage unsigned content, or that clear staged deployments after hardening policy, are not exposed to this residual finalize path.
Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.
--- CME Mitigation Guidance (2026-10-20) ---
Disclaimer: The following mitigation solutions are provided as a courtesy, pending the application of an official patch. This content was generated utilizing AI tools in conjunction with data from https://cmetaxonomy.org. Customers are advised to independently evaluate and test these temporary mitigations within their own infrastructure.
The highest-value action is to revalidate container image signatures against active container signature policy before finalizing or booting staged ostree deployments in bootc and ostree: upgrade to the fixed Bootc/Ostree/Rpm Ostree/Rust Zincati builds, which revalidates container image signatures against the active container signature policy in /etc/containers/policy.json before finalizing or booting already-staged ostree deployments, closing all 2 injection vectors (host reboot into pending staged deployment, bootc upgrade --from-downloaded deployment application). Until patched, this is only a concern on Linux systems using bootc or ostree, including RHEL image-mode hosts — Non-Linux platforms are unaffected — so Clear all existing staged ostree deployments immediately after hardening /etc/containers/policy.json and ensure unsigned container images are never staged. As a compensating measure, Run SELinux in enforcing mode to confine processes running from finalized deployments to defined domains and Deploy IMA/EVM appraisal to verify executable file signatures at runtime and block untrusted binaries. These controls limit blast radius and contain exploitation, but they do not fix the underlying missing signature revalidation defect — apply the upstream patch to fully remediate.
Highest-impact CME: CME-712 Container Image Signing and Provenance Verification (Cosign/Sigstore) (high)
| Product | Package | State | Advisory |
|---|---|---|---|
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10 | bootc | Not affected | |
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10 | ostree | Not affected | |
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10 | rpm-ostree | Not affected | |
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 | ostree | Not affected | |
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 | bootc | Not affected | |
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 | ostree | Not affected | |
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 | rpm-ostree | Not affected | |
| Red Hat Hardened Images | bootc | Affected | |
| Red Hat Hardened Images | ostree | Affected | |
| Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4 | openshift/ose-rhel-coreos-8 | Not affected | |
| Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4 | openshift/ose-rhel-coreos-9 | Not affected | |
| Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4 | ostree | Not affected | |
| Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 5 | openshift/ose-rhel-coreos-9 | Not affected | |
| Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 5 | ostree | Not affected |
Contains Red Hat Security Data © Red Hat, Inc., licensed under CC BY 4.0. Source: https://access.redhat.com/security/data. Modified: reformatted. Red Hat's page for CVE-2026-16460.
The attack patterns MITRE's CAPEC relates to this record's weaknesses, as MITRE names them. Credits. More on the page of CWE-345 (12).