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CVE-2026-16460

7.4 highEPSS 0.10%

High (7.4). EPSS 0.10% estimated probability of exploitation activity in the next 30 days.

On this page
A flaw was found in bootc and ostree. Already-staged deployments are finalized without revalidating the deployment's container image against the current containers signature policy. Unsigned OS content staged under a prior permissive policy can remain bootable after policy is hardened to reject unsigned images, leading to full host compromise on reboot.

Severity

CVSS 3.1

7.4 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
EPSS
0.10% (unchanged from 0.10% a week ago) estimated probability of exploitation activity in the next 30 days; 1st percentile. Scored 2026-11-17. A forecast for this CVE across the internet, not for your own systems.
CISA's assessment (SSVC)
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total, assessed 2026-10-19. From CISA's Vulnrichment in the CVE List: whether it is exploited, whether exploiting it can be automated, and how much control it gives.
CWE
CWE-345 Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
OWASP Top 10
A08:2025 Software or Data Integrity Failures
Published
Modified
NVD analysis
Awaiting analysis
Record from
the NVD, synced

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Red Hat

Red Hat rates this Important.

Red Hat's statement

Container signature policy gates pull and import of bootc images, but does not revalidate content that is already staged for the next boot. Tightening /etc/containers/policy.json alone does not invalidate previously staged deployments; those deployments can still be finalized by ordinary reboot or by apply paths that unlock already-staged content. This issue is distinct from, and compositionally related to, the mutable-tag / default-policy. Systems that never stage unsigned content, or that clear staged deployments after hardening policy, are not exposed to this residual finalize path.

Red Hat's mitigation

Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.

--- CME Mitigation Guidance (2026-10-20) ---

Disclaimer: The following mitigation solutions are provided as a courtesy, pending the application of an official patch. This content was generated utilizing AI tools in conjunction with data from https://cmetaxonomy.org. Customers are advised to independently evaluate and test these temporary mitigations within their own infrastructure.

The highest-value action is to revalidate container image signatures against active container signature policy before finalizing or booting staged ostree deployments in bootc and ostree: upgrade to the fixed Bootc/Ostree/Rpm Ostree/Rust Zincati builds, which revalidates container image signatures against the active container signature policy in /etc/containers/policy.json before finalizing or booting already-staged ostree deployments, closing all 2 injection vectors (host reboot into pending staged deployment, bootc upgrade --from-downloaded deployment application). Until patched, this is only a concern on Linux systems using bootc or ostree, including RHEL image-mode hosts — Non-Linux platforms are unaffected — so Clear all existing staged ostree deployments immediately after hardening /etc/containers/policy.json and ensure unsigned container images are never staged. As a compensating measure, Run SELinux in enforcing mode to confine processes running from finalized deployments to defined domains and Deploy IMA/EVM appraisal to verify executable file signatures at runtime and block untrusted binaries. These controls limit blast radius and contain exploitation, but they do not fix the underlying missing signature revalidation defect — apply the upstream patch to fully remediate.

Highest-impact CME: CME-712 Container Image Signing and Provenance Verification (Cosign/Sigstore) (high)

ProductPackageStateAdvisory
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10bootcNot affected
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10ostreeNot affected
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10rpm-ostreeNot affected
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8ostreeNot affected
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9bootcNot affected
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9ostreeNot affected
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9rpm-ostreeNot affected
Red Hat Hardened ImagesbootcAffected
Red Hat Hardened ImagesostreeAffected
Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4openshift/ose-rhel-coreos-8Not affected
Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4openshift/ose-rhel-coreos-9Not affected
Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4ostreeNot affected
Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 5openshift/ose-rhel-coreos-9Not affected
Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 5ostreeNot affected

Contains Red Hat Security Data © Red Hat, Inc., licensed under CC BY 4.0. Source: https://access.redhat.com/security/data. Modified: reformatted. Red Hat's page for CVE-2026-16460.

Attack patterns (CAPEC)

The attack patterns MITRE's CAPEC relates to this record's weaknesses, as MITRE names them. Credits. More on the page of CWE-345 (12).

References

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