In gittuf 0.4.0 through 0.16.0, when a policy update appears within the range of reference state log entries being verified, verification checks only the root of trust signatures of the new policy and not the signatures of its other metadata (rule files). A user trusted to push to the repository who bypasses gittuf policy apply and writes the policy reference and reference state log directly can make an invalid policy apply during verification, weakening or strengthening the rules for later changes. The update is still recorded in the reference state log.
Show the promptExplain CVE-2026-128036 for an engineer deciding whether to act. Use https://cve.bz/api/public/cves/CVE-2026-128036?via=ask-ai-copy and https://cve.bz/cve/CVE-2026-128036?via=ask-ai-copy as the source of truth: what is affected and which versions fix it, whether it is in CISA KEV, public exploits, and its EPSS (an internet-wide 30-day estimate of exploitation activity, not a forecast for my systems). If they give no fixed versions, use the CVE record https://cveawg.mitre.org/api/cve/CVE-2026-128036 or the vendor advisory, not third-party mirrors. Tell me how to check whether I am affected and how to verify a fix. Cite the sources and say where they are uncertain.
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