RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. In the affected revision identified by the advisory, the AMQP 1.0 server_mode parser in deps/amqp10_common/src/amqp10_binary_parser.erl stops at the first body section and preserves the remaining bytes in bare_and_footer without validating message-section order. An authenticated publisher with write permission can place a properties section carrying a forged user-id after the body, causing rabbit_access_control:check_user_id/2 to see no user-id while permissive downstream AMQP 1.0 decoders or AMQP 0-9-1 conversion through classic and quorum queues expose the forged identity. Applications that rely on RabbitMQ-validated user-id metadata can therefore accept attacker-controlled publisher attribution. Strict consumers that reject out-of-order sections are not vulnerable to identity spoofing, and the issue does not bypass broker routing or destination authorization. This issue is fixed in version 4.3.5.
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