Stored cross-site scripting in pgAdmin 4's error-rendering and plan-node-rendering paths. Text returned by a PostgreSQL server (ErrorResponse messages, including object names quoted back inside relation-does-not-exist errors and inside EXPLAIN Recheck Cond / Exact Heap Blocks fields) was passed verbatim through html-react-parser at every user-facing sink — the notifier toasts, FormFooterMessage / FormInput help and error areas, FormNote, ModalProvider AlertContent and confirmDelete, ToolErrorView, the Explain visualiser's NodeText panel, the SQL editor confirm dialogs, ConfirmSaveContent, PreferencesHelper modal alerts, and SelectThemes helper text. A PostgreSQL server an attacker controls — or any server returning attacker-influenced text such as a table or column name a low-privilege database user can create — could inject arbitrary HTML (including <iframe>) into the pgAdmin DOM the moment the victim's pgAdmin connected to that server or viewed an Explain plan that referenced the crafted object.
The injected iframe's srcdoc could fetch attacker-served JavaScript and, by writing to parent.location, redirect the victim's top-level pgAdmin browser tab to an attacker-controlled URL. Because the injection originates from inside pgAdmin's own interface, standard anti-clickjacking controls (X-Frame-Options, Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors) do not mitigate it. A phishing page rendered inside the legitimate pgAdmin window is indistinguishable from a genuine pgAdmin dialog.
Fix combines three complementary layers. (1) DOMPurify sanitisation is wrapped around every html-react-parser call site reachable from notifier, alert, form-error, Explain, and SQL-editor flows. (2) A new plain-text rendering contract — SafeMessage / SafeHtmlMessage components plus Notifier.errorText / alertText / warningText / infoText / successText helpers — is introduced; around fifty callers across browser, tools, dashboard, debugger, misc, llm, preferences, schema diff, and the SQL editor that previously interpolated backend-derived strings are migrated to the plain-text variants. (3) Backend HTML-escape is applied at the post-connection-SQL handler (execute_post_connection_sql) via a new sanitize_external_text helper, so third-party JSON consumers (audit logs, API clients) never receive raw markup either; the Explain plan-info renderer is also patched to _.escape Recheck Cond and Exact Heap Blocks at construction (matching every sibling field), giving defence in depth even before DOMPurify runs.
This issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 6.0 before 9.16.
0.3%(unchanged from 0.3% a week ago; 0.3% 30 days ago) estimated probability of exploitation activity in the next 30 days; 19th percentile. Scored 2026-11-17. A forecast for this CVE across the internet, not for your own systems.
CISA's assessment (SSVC)
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total, assessed 2026-06-22. From CISA's Vulnrichment in the CVE List: whether it is exploited, whether exploiting it can be automated, and how much control it gives.
CWEs
CWE-79Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (Cross-site Scripting) CWE-116Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output
Show the promptExplain CVE-2026-12048 for an engineer deciding whether to act. Use https://cve.bz/api/public/cves/CVE-2026-12048?via=ask-ai-copy and https://cve.bz/cve/CVE-2026-12048?via=ask-ai-copy as the source of truth: what is affected and which versions fix it, whether it is in CISA KEV, public exploits, and its EPSS (an internet-wide 30-day estimate of exploitation activity, not a forecast for my systems). If they give no fixed versions, use the CVE record https://cveawg.mitre.org/api/cve/CVE-2026-12048 or the vendor advisory, not third-party mirrors. Tell me how to check whether I am affected and how to verify a fix. Cite the sources and say where they are uncertain.
Opens a third-party assistant; its answer is its own, not cve.bz's. The prompt holds only this CVE's id and public links.
From the distributions' data via OSV.dev: SUSE security data, CC BY 4.0. Modified: reformatted and linked to CVE records. Credits. On the distributions' own pages: openSUSE.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
CAPEC-73 User-Controlled Filename Likelihood: High · Severity: High
CAPEC-81 Web Server Logs Tampering Likelihood: Medium · Severity: High
CAPEC-85 AJAX Footprinting Likelihood: High · Severity: Low
CAPEC-104 Cross Zone Scripting Likelihood: Medium · Severity: High
CAPEC-63 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Likelihood: High · Severity: Very High
CAPEC-209 XSS Using MIME Type Mismatch Severity: Medium
CAPEC-588 DOM-Based XSS Likelihood: High · Severity: Very High
CAPEC-591 Reflected XSS Likelihood: High · Severity: Very High
CAPEC-592 Stored XSS Likelihood: High · Severity: Very High
The attack patterns MITRE's CAPEC relates to this record's weaknesses, as MITRE names them. Credits.