FreeSWITCH is a Software Defined Telecom Stack enabling the digital transformation from proprietary telecom switches to a software implementation that runs on any commodity hardware. Prior to 1.11.2, after FreeSWITCH has learned and closed source learning for an RTP peer, read_rtp_packet() and rtp_common_read() in src/switch_rtp.c reject RTP from an unrecognized source only after packet classification and, for encrypted calls, SRTP processing. An unauthenticated attacker with UDP reachability to an active RTP or SRTP media port can sustain a foreign-source packet flood that occupies the media read path and prevents legitimate media from entering FreeSWITCH on calls that consume incoming media for relay or echo. The resulting one-way audio allows the affected endpoint to continue hearing the other party, but the other party loses that endpoint's audio, leaving SIP signaling established while the call is unusable for conversation. Transmit-only playback was unaffected in testing. A caller can learn the media port from the SDP answer, while a third party must first discover an active port, and no valid SRTP key is required. This issue is fixed in version 1.11.2.
Show the promptExplain CVE-2026-119292 for an engineer deciding whether to act. Use https://cve.bz/api/public/cves/CVE-2026-119292?via=ask-ai-copy and https://cve.bz/cve/CVE-2026-119292?via=ask-ai-copy as the source of truth: what is affected and which versions fix it, whether it is in CISA KEV, public exploits, and its EPSS (an internet-wide 30-day estimate of exploitation activity, not a forecast for my systems). If they give no fixed versions, use the CVE record https://cveawg.mitre.org/api/cve/CVE-2026-119292 or the vendor advisory, not third-party mirrors. Tell me how to check whether I am affected and how to verify a fix. Cite the sources and say where they are uncertain.
Opens a third-party assistant; its answer is its own, not cve.bz's. The prompt holds only this CVE's id and public links.