CVSS 4.0
6.3 mediumCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NMedium (6.3) in go-chi chi. EPSS 0.1% estimated probability of exploitation activity in the next 30 days. Fixed in github.com/go-chi/chi/v5 5.4.0.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:Ngithub.com/go-chi/chi/v5 (Go): fixed in 5.4.0Explain CVE-2026-114437 for an engineer deciding whether to act. Use https://cve.bz/api/public/cves/CVE-2026-114437?via=ask-ai-copy and https://cve.bz/cve/CVE-2026-114437?via=ask-ai-copy as the source of truth: what is affected and which versions fix it, whether it is in CISA KEV, public exploits, and its EPSS (an internet-wide 30-day estimate of exploitation activity, not a forecast for my systems). If they give no fixed versions, use the CVE record https://cveawg.mitre.org/api/cve/CVE-2026-114437 or the vendor advisory, not third-party mirrors. Tell me how to check whether I am affected and how to verify a fix. Cite the sources and say where they are uncertain.Opens a third-party assistant; its answer is its own, not cve.bz's. The prompt holds only this CVE's id and public links.
From the CNA's record in the CVE List.
| Product | Affected |
|---|---|
| go-chi chi | before 5.4.0 |
| Advisory | Ecosystem | Package | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GHSA-j6qf-3m9c-vwj3 | Go | github.com/go-chi/chi/v5 | <5.4.0 | 5.4.0 |
| Distribution | Release | Package | Fixed in | Advisory |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debian | 12, 13, 14 | golang-github-go-chi-chi | no fix listed | DEBIAN-CVE-2026-114437 |
| Ubuntu | 22.04:LTS, 24.04:LTS, 26.04:LTS and 1 more | golang-github-go-chi-chi | no fix listed | UBUNTU-CVE-2026-114437 |
| openSUSE | Leap 16.0 | hauler | 2.1.2-bp160.1.1 | openSUSE-SU-2026:22201-1 |
| openSUSE | Leap 16.1 | hauler | 2.1.2-bp161.1.1 | openSUSE-SU-2026:22317-1 |
| openSUSE | Tumbleweed | hauler | 2.1.2-2.1 | openSUSE-SU-2026:12290-1 |
From the distributions' data via OSV.dev: the Debian Security Tracker; Ubuntu Security Notices © Canonical Ltd., CC BY-SA 4.0; SUSE security data, CC BY 4.0. Modified: reformatted and linked to CVE records. Credits. On the distributions' own pages: Debian · Ubuntu · openSUSE.
Red Hat rates this Moderate.
This vulnerability is rated as Moderate severity because exploitation requires direct network access to bypass reverse proxies and only affects services configured to rely on the optional ClientIPFromXFF middleware for security decisions. In standard Red Hat product architectures, backend components are deployed behind ingress controllers, load balancers, or API gateways that isolate endpoints and control header propagation. Consequently, the potential for IP spoofing is constrained to custom or non-standard deployments where untrusted network actors can establish direct connections to the application port.
Restrict network exposure so that the application only accepts connections from trusted reverse proxies or load balancers, preventing direct client reachability:
1. Configure firewall rules on the host to only allow traffic from trusted proxy IP addresses to the application port:
```
firewall-cmd --permanent --zone=trusted --add-source=<TRUSTED_PROXY_IP>
firewall-cmd --permanent --remove-port=<PORT>/tcp
firewall-cmd --reload
```
2. In OpenShift or Kubernetes environments, apply an Ingress NetworkPolicy ensuring pod endpoints only accept traffic from designated ingress router controllers.
3. Configure the upstream reverse proxy (e.g., Envoy, HAProxy, or NGINX) to strip or sanitize incoming X-Forwarded-For headers from untrusted external clients before routing requests to backend services.
Caveats: Restricting direct access may interrupt client traffic if services were previously exposed directly without a proxy. Reloading firewalld with `firewall-cmd --reload` will briefly reapply filtering rules and may affect active network sessions.
| Product | Package | State | Advisory |
|---|---|---|---|
| Logging Subsystem for Red Hat OpenShift | openshift-logging/opa-openshift-rhel9 | Out of support scope | |
| Multicluster Engine for Kubernetes | multicluster-engine/managedcluster-import-controller-rhel9 | Fix deferred | |
| OpenShift Pipelines | openshift-pipelines-client | Fix deferred | |
| OpenShift Serverless | openshift-serverless-1/kn-plugin-event-sender-rhel9 | Fix deferred | |
| Red Hat Advanced Cluster Management for Kubernetes 2 | rhacm2/observatorium-rhel9 | Fix deferred | |
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 | osbuild-composer | Fix deferred | |
| Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4 | cri-o | Fix deferred | |
| Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4 | openshift4/oc-mirror-plugin-rhel9 | Fix deferred | |
| Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4 | openshift4/ose-telemeter | Fix deferred | |
| Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4 | openshift4/ose-telemeter-rhel9 | Fix deferred | |
| Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 5 | openshift5/ose-telemeter-rhel9 | Fix deferred | |
| Red Hat OpenShift Dev Spaces | devspaces/udi-rhel9 | Fix deferred | |
| Red Hat OpenShift distributed tracing 3 | rhosdt/tempo-gateway-opa-rhel9 | Fix deferred | |
| Red Hat Quay 3 | quay/quay-rhel8 | Out of support scope | |
| Red Hat Quay 3 | quay/quay-rhel9 | Out of support scope | |
| Red Hat Satellite 6 | satellite/iop-ingress-rhel9 | Fix deferred | |
| Red Hat Trusted Artifact Signer | rhtas/cosign-rhel9 | Fix deferred | |
| Red Hat Web Terminal | web-terminal/web-terminal-tooling-rhel9 | Out of support scope | |
| Zero Trust Workload Identity Manager - Tech Preview | zero-trust-workload-identity-manager/spiffe-spire-agent-rhel9 | Out of support scope | |
| Zero Trust Workload Identity Manager - Tech Preview | zero-trust-workload-identity-manager/spiffe-spire-oidc-discovery-provider-rhel9 | Out of support scope | |
| 3 more in the JSON and on Red Hat's page. | |||
Contains Red Hat Security Data © Red Hat, Inc., licensed under CC BY 4.0. Source: https://access.redhat.com/security/data. Modified: reformatted. Red Hat's page for CVE-2026-114437.
The attack patterns MITRE's CAPEC relates to this record's weaknesses, as MITRE names them. Credits.