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CVE-2026-114437 go-chi chi: Use of Less Trusted Source

6.3 mediumEPSS 0.1%Fix available

Medium (6.3) in go-chi chi. EPSS 0.1% estimated probability of exploitation activity in the next 30 days. Fixed in github.com/go-chi/chi/v5 5.4.0.

On this page
In the Golang Chi web framework, the ClientIPFromXFF middleware skips any X-Forwarded-For entry in a configured trusted CIDR but never verifies that the direct TCP peer in http.Request.RemoteAddr belongs to that CIDR. A client that can reach the Go server directly can therefore append a trusted-looking proxy address and choose the client IP returned by middleware.GetClientIP. This issue affects chi before 5.4.0.

Severity

CVSS 4.0

6.3 medium
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

CVSS 3.1

4.8 medium
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
EPSS
0.1% (unchanged from 0.1% a week ago) estimated probability of exploitation activity in the next 30 days; 3rd percentile. Scored 2026-11-17. A forecast for this CVE across the internet, not for your own systems.
CISA's assessment (SSVC)
Exploitation: PoC · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial, assessed 2026-10-21. From CISA's Vulnrichment in the CVE List: whether it is exploited, whether exploiting it can be automated, and how much control it gives.
CWE
CWE-348 Use of Less Trusted Source
Published
Modified
NVD analysis
Deferred: the NVD does not plan to analyze it
Record from
the NVD, synced

Fix and patched versions

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Affected

Versions

From the CNA's record in the CVE List.

ProductAffected
go-chi chibefore 5.4.0

Packages (OSV)

AdvisoryEcosystemPackageAffectedFixed in
GHSA-j6qf-3m9c-vwj3Gogithub.com/go-chi/chi/v5<5.4.05.4.0

Linux distributions

DistributionReleasePackageFixed inAdvisory
Debian12, 13, 14golang-github-go-chi-chino fix listedDEBIAN-CVE-2026-114437
Ubuntu22.04:LTS, 24.04:LTS, 26.04:LTS and 1 moregolang-github-go-chi-chino fix listedUBUNTU-CVE-2026-114437
openSUSELeap 16.0hauler2.1.2-bp160.1.1openSUSE-SU-2026:22201-1
openSUSELeap 16.1hauler2.1.2-bp161.1.1openSUSE-SU-2026:22317-1
openSUSETumbleweedhauler2.1.2-2.1openSUSE-SU-2026:12290-1

From the distributions' data via OSV.dev: the Debian Security Tracker; Ubuntu Security Notices © Canonical Ltd., CC BY-SA 4.0; SUSE security data, CC BY 4.0. Modified: reformatted and linked to CVE records. Credits. On the distributions' own pages: Debian · Ubuntu · openSUSE.

Red Hat

Red Hat rates this Moderate.

Red Hat's statement

This vulnerability is rated as Moderate severity because exploitation requires direct network access to bypass reverse proxies and only affects services configured to rely on the optional ClientIPFromXFF middleware for security decisions. In standard Red Hat product architectures, backend components are deployed behind ingress controllers, load balancers, or API gateways that isolate endpoints and control header propagation. Consequently, the potential for IP spoofing is constrained to custom or non-standard deployments where untrusted network actors can establish direct connections to the application port.

Red Hat's mitigation

Restrict network exposure so that the application only accepts connections from trusted reverse proxies or load balancers, preventing direct client reachability:

1. Configure firewall rules on the host to only allow traffic from trusted proxy IP addresses to the application port:

```

firewall-cmd --permanent --zone=trusted --add-source=<TRUSTED_PROXY_IP>

firewall-cmd --permanent --remove-port=<PORT>/tcp

firewall-cmd --reload

```

2. In OpenShift or Kubernetes environments, apply an Ingress NetworkPolicy ensuring pod endpoints only accept traffic from designated ingress router controllers.

3. Configure the upstream reverse proxy (e.g., Envoy, HAProxy, or NGINX) to strip or sanitize incoming X-Forwarded-For headers from untrusted external clients before routing requests to backend services.

Caveats: Restricting direct access may interrupt client traffic if services were previously exposed directly without a proxy. Reloading firewalld with `firewall-cmd --reload` will briefly reapply filtering rules and may affect active network sessions.

ProductPackageStateAdvisory
Logging Subsystem for Red Hat OpenShiftopenshift-logging/opa-openshift-rhel9Out of support scope
Multicluster Engine for Kubernetesmulticluster-engine/managedcluster-import-controller-rhel9Fix deferred
OpenShift Pipelinesopenshift-pipelines-clientFix deferred
OpenShift Serverlessopenshift-serverless-1/kn-plugin-event-sender-rhel9Fix deferred
Red Hat Advanced Cluster Management for Kubernetes 2rhacm2/observatorium-rhel9Fix deferred
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8osbuild-composerFix deferred
Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4cri-oFix deferred
Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4openshift4/oc-mirror-plugin-rhel9Fix deferred
Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4openshift4/ose-telemeterFix deferred
Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4openshift4/ose-telemeter-rhel9Fix deferred
Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 5openshift5/ose-telemeter-rhel9Fix deferred
Red Hat OpenShift Dev Spacesdevspaces/udi-rhel9Fix deferred
Red Hat OpenShift distributed tracing 3rhosdt/tempo-gateway-opa-rhel9Fix deferred
Red Hat Quay 3quay/quay-rhel8Out of support scope
Red Hat Quay 3quay/quay-rhel9Out of support scope
Red Hat Satellite 6satellite/iop-ingress-rhel9Fix deferred
Red Hat Trusted Artifact Signerrhtas/cosign-rhel9Fix deferred
Red Hat Web Terminalweb-terminal/web-terminal-tooling-rhel9Out of support scope
Zero Trust Workload Identity Manager - Tech Previewzero-trust-workload-identity-manager/spiffe-spire-agent-rhel9Out of support scope
Zero Trust Workload Identity Manager - Tech Previewzero-trust-workload-identity-manager/spiffe-spire-oidc-discovery-provider-rhel9Out of support scope
3 more in the JSON and on Red Hat's page.

Contains Red Hat Security Data © Red Hat, Inc., licensed under CC BY 4.0. Source: https://access.redhat.com/security/data. Modified: reformatted. Red Hat's page for CVE-2026-114437.

Attack patterns (CAPEC)

  • CAPEC-73 User-Controlled Filename Likelihood: High · Severity: High
  • CAPEC-76 Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls Likelihood: High · Severity: Very High
  • CAPEC-85 AJAX Footprinting Likelihood: High · Severity: Low
  • CAPEC-141 Cache Poisoning Likelihood: High · Severity: High
  • CAPEC-142 DNS Cache Poisoning Likelihood: High · Severity: High

The attack patterns MITRE's CAPEC relates to this record's weaknesses, as MITRE names them. Credits.

References

Check your stackJSON