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CVE-2026-105959 Year 2038 problem, Y2K38, Y2038, Epochalypse

7.5 highEPSS 0.5%

High (7.5). EPSS 0.5% estimated probability of exploitation activity in the next 30 days.

On this page
A flaw was found in spice-server. The GLZ encoder dictionary restore path truncates a size_t allocation size to int when calling the malloc callback, allowing a malicious authenticated SPICE client during VM live migration to trigger a massive heap buffer overflow by sending a crafted max_encoders value in migration data.

Severity

CVSS 3.1

7.5 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
EPSS
0.5% (unchanged from 0.5% a week ago; 0.4% 30 days ago) estimated probability of exploitation activity in the next 30 days; 42nd percentile. Scored 2026-11-17. A forecast for this CVE across the internet, not for your own systems.
CISA's assessment (SSVC)
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total, assessed 2026-10-16. From CISA's Vulnrichment in the CVE List: whether it is exploited, whether exploiting it can be automated, and how much control it gives.
CWE
CWE-190 Integer Overflow or Wraparound (Year 2038 problem, Y2K38, Y2038, Epochalypse)
Published
Modified
NVD analysis
Awaiting analysis
Record from
the NVD, synced

Fix and patched versions

Ask an AI about this CVE

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Linux distributions

DistributionReleasePackageFixed inAdvisory
Debian12, 13, 14spiceno fix listedDEBIAN-CVE-2026-105959
Ubuntu16.04:LTS, 18.04:LTS, 20.04:LTS and 4 morespice, spice-gtk, spice-protocolno fix listedUBUNTU-CVE-2026-105959
UbuntuPro:14.04:LTSspiceno fix listedUBUNTU-CVE-2026-105959
openSUSETumbleweedspice0.16.0-3.1openSUSE-SU-2026:12222-1
Alpaquita23spice0.15.1-r1BELL-CVE-2026-105959
Alpaquita25spice0.15.2-r2BELL-CVE-2026-105959
Alpaquitastreamspice0.16.0-r1BELL-CVE-2026-105959

From the distributions' data via OSV.dev: the Debian Security Tracker; Ubuntu Security Notices © Canonical Ltd., CC BY-SA 4.0; SUSE security data, CC BY 4.0; BellSoft's OSV database, MIT. Modified: reformatted and linked to CVE records. Credits. On the distributions' own pages: Debian · Ubuntu · openSUSE · Alpaquita.

Red Hat

Red Hat rates this Important.

Red Hat's statement

This vulnerability is rated as Important rather than Critical because successful exploitation requires valid client authentication and must coincide with an active virtual machine live migration window. In Red Hat virtualization environments, SPICE services are typically hosted by QEMU processes confined by sVirt SELinux protections, which restricts host system compromise even if process crash or code execution occurs. Environments that configure headless guests, use alternative display protocols such as VNC, or isolate management access are not susceptible to untrusted client connections.

Red Hat's mitigation

This vulnerability is only exploitable during VM live migration by an authenticated SPICE client. If live migration is not required, disabling it eliminates the attack surface. If live migration is needed, restrict SPICE client connections to trusted networks using firewall rules and enforce strong authentication (TLS with mutual certificate validation, or SASL with strong credentials) to limit who can connect as a SPICE client.

--- CME Mitigation Guidance (2026-10-20) ---

Disclaimer: The following mitigation solutions are provided as a courtesy, pending the application of an official patch. This content was generated utilizing AI tools in conjunction with data from https://cmetaxonomy.org. Customers are advised to independently evaluate and test these temporary mitigations within their own infrastructure.

The highest-value action is to prevent integer truncation of size_t allocation calculations to int when invoking the GlzEncoderUsrContext::malloc callback in the GLZ dictionary restore path: upgrade to the fixed Spice/Spice Server builds, which prevent truncation of size_t allocation sizes to int when invoking the GLZ dictionary malloc callback, closing all 2 injection vectors (crafted SPICE_MSGC_MIGRATE_DATA message, malicious max_encoders field in GlzEncDictRestoreData). Until patched, this is a concern on 64-bit Linux hosts running SPICE server, so Disable VM live migration if not required, restrict SPICE client access to trusted networks using firewall rules, and enforce strong authentication via SASL or TLS with mutual certificate validation. As a compensating measure, Run SELinux in enforcing mode to confine the SPICE server process domain and restrict unauthorized system access if the heap overflow is exploited. These controls limit blast radius and contain exploitation, but they do not fix the underlying integer truncation defect — apply the upstream patch to fully remediate.

Highest-impact CME: CME-301 SELinux (Enforcing Mode) (medium)

ProductPackageStateAdvisory
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6spice-serverAffected
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7spiceAffected
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8spiceAffected

Contains Red Hat Security Data © Red Hat, Inc., licensed under CC BY 4.0. Source: https://access.redhat.com/security/data. Modified: reformatted. Red Hat's page for CVE-2026-105959.

Attack patterns (CAPEC)

  • CAPEC-92 Forced Integer Overflow Likelihood: High · Severity: High

The attack patterns MITRE's CAPEC relates to this record's weaknesses, as MITRE names them. Credits.

References

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