cve.bz

CVE-2026-105958 Out-of-bounds Write

7.5 highEPSS 0.2%

High (7.5). EPSS 0.2% estimated probability of exploitation activity in the next 30 days.

On this page
A flaw was found in spice-server. Multiple migration data handlers use client-supplied offsets from SPICE_MSGC_MIGRATE_DATA messages without bounds validation, allowing a malicious authenticated SPICE client during VM live migration to read arbitrary heap memory or trigger heap corruption via out-of-bounds read and write operations on the message buffer.

Severity

CVSS 3.1

7.5 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
EPSS
0.2% (unchanged from 0.2% a week ago; 0.2% 30 days ago) estimated probability of exploitation activity in the next 30 days; 16th percentile. Scored 2026-11-17. A forecast for this CVE across the internet, not for your own systems.
CISA's assessment (SSVC)
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total, assessed 2026-10-16. From CISA's Vulnrichment in the CVE List: whether it is exploited, whether exploiting it can be automated, and how much control it gives.
CWE
CWE-787 Out-of-bounds Write
Published
Modified
NVD analysis
Awaiting analysis
Record from
the NVD, synced

Fix and patched versions

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Linux distributions

DistributionReleasePackageFixed inAdvisory
Debian12, 13, 14spiceno fix listedDEBIAN-CVE-2026-105958
Ubuntu16.04:LTS, 18.04:LTS, 20.04:LTS and 4 morespice, spice-gtk, spice-protocolno fix listedUBUNTU-CVE-2026-105958
UbuntuPro:14.04:LTSspiceno fix listedUBUNTU-CVE-2026-105958
openSUSETumbleweedspice0.16.0-3.1openSUSE-SU-2026:12222-1
Alpaquita23spice0.15.1-r1BELL-CVE-2026-105958
Alpaquita25spice0.15.2-r2BELL-CVE-2026-105958
Alpaquitastreamspice0.16.0-r1BELL-CVE-2026-105958

From the distributions' data via OSV.dev: the Debian Security Tracker; Ubuntu Security Notices © Canonical Ltd., CC BY-SA 4.0; SUSE security data, CC BY 4.0; BellSoft's OSV database, MIT. Modified: reformatted and linked to CVE records. Credits. On the distributions' own pages: Debian · Ubuntu · openSUSE · Alpaquita.

Red Hat

Red Hat rates this Important.

Red Hat's statement

Red Hat has evaluated this vulnerability as an Important severity flaw because an authenticated attacker could corrupt host memory and compromise the hypervisor process running SPICE, breaking virtualization boundaries. To trigger this condition, a remote user must possess valid credentials to connect to the SPICE remote desktop service while a virtual machine is actively undergoing live migration. In typical enterprise deployments where SPICE interfaces are restricted to isolated management networks, exposure is limited by network topology and the narrow timing window required for the attack.

Red Hat's mitigation

This vulnerability is only exploitable during VM live migration by an authenticated SPICE client. If live migration is not required, disabling it eliminates the attack surface. If live migration is needed, restrict SPICE client connections to trusted networks using firewall rules and enforce strong authentication (TLS with mutual certificate validation, or SASL with strong credentials) to limit who can connect as a SPICE client.

--- CME Mitigation Guidance (2026-10-20) ---

Disclaimer: The following mitigation solutions are provided as a courtesy, pending the application of an official patch. This content was generated utilizing AI tools in conjunction with data from https://cmetaxonomy.org. Customers are advised to independently evaluate and test these temporary mitigations within their own infrastructure.

The highest-value action is to enforce strict bounds validation on client-supplied offsets and buffer lengths across all SPICE migration data handlers prior to memory operations: upgrade to the fixed Spice/Spice Server builds, which validate migration data offsets and read bounds against declared message lengths instead of reallocating from attacker-controlled values, closing all 4 injection vectors (RedCharDevice restore via write_data_ptr offset manipulation, smartcard restore via read_data_ptr offset manipulation, reds agent state restore via msg_header_ptr offset manipulation, DisplayChannelClient migrate data handling via surfaces_at_client_ptr offset manipulation). Until patched, this is a concern on Linux hosts running Spice Server with VM live migration enabled, so disable VM live migration if not required, restrict SPICE client network access using firewall rules, and enforce strong authentication via SASL or mutual TLS. As a compensating measure, randomize heap and binary addresses using ASLR to impede reliable exploitation of out-of-bounds reads and writes, enforce full RELRO and PIE to make Global Offset Table entries read-only and prevent control flow diversion via heap corruption, validate indirect call targets using Control Flow Integrity or shadow call stacks to block redirection upon corruption of function pointers or vtables, enable FORTIFY_SOURCE to detect buffer overflows during memory copy operations such as memcpy and abort execution, and confine the SPICE server process using SELinux in enforcing mode to restrict host access if arbitrary code execution occurs. These controls limit blast radius and contain exploitation, but they do not fix the underlying unchecked migration data offsets defect — apply the upstream patch to fully remediate.

Highest-impact CME: CME-301 SELinux (Enforcing Mode) (medium)

ProductPackageStateAdvisory
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6spice-serverAffected
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7spiceAffected
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8spiceAffected

Contains Red Hat Security Data © Red Hat, Inc., licensed under CC BY 4.0. Source: https://access.redhat.com/security/data. Modified: reformatted. Red Hat's page for CVE-2026-105958.

References

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