CVE-2026-102711
Two issues in the ThreadX loadable-module loader, reached when a device loads an attacker-controlled module object via `_txm_module_manager_memory_load` / `_txm_module_manager_in_place_load` — APIs that take ONLY a base pointer, no image length, so every size/offset field in `TXM_MODULE_PREAMBLE` is fully attacker-trusted: (1) a heap OOB **read** (`code_size` trusted as the source-image length in the code-copy loop), and (2) a control-flow-integrity / defense-in-depth gap (module entry/start/callback/stop pointers computed as `code_start + preamble_offset` with only a `!= 0` check, and the preamble `checksum` never verified). No controlled OOB write was found (honest — the copy destination is overflow-guarded).
- CVSS 4.0
- 5.7
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N - EPSS
- 0.07% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days; higher than 0% of CVEs (scores of 2026-10-25)
- CWEs
- CWE-125, CWE-345, CWE-1284
- Published
- Modified
- Record from
- the NVD, synced