CVSS 3.1
10.0 criticalCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:NCritical (10.0) in node-saml node-saml. EPSS 0.5% estimated probability of exploitation activity in the next 30 days. Fixed in @node-saml/node-saml 5.1.0.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N@node-saml/node-saml (npm): fixed in 5.1.0@node-saml/passport-saml (npm): fixed in 5.1.0Explain CVE-2025-54419 for an engineer deciding whether to act. Use https://cve.bz/api/public/cves/CVE-2025-54419?via=ask-ai-copy and https://cve.bz/cve/CVE-2025-54419?via=ask-ai-copy as the source of truth: what is affected and which versions fix it, whether it is in CISA KEV, public exploits, and its EPSS (an internet-wide 30-day estimate of exploitation activity, not a forecast for my systems). If they give no fixed versions, use the CVE record https://cveawg.mitre.org/api/cve/CVE-2025-54419 or the vendor advisory, not third-party mirrors. Tell me how to check whether I am affected and how to verify a fix. Cite the sources and say where they are uncertain.Opens a third-party assistant; its answer is its own, not cve.bz's. The prompt holds only this CVE's id and public links.
From the CNA's record in the CVE List.
| Product | Affected |
|---|---|
| node-saml | = 5.0.1 |
| Advisory | Ecosystem | Package | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GHSA-4mxg-3p6v-xgq3 | npm | @node-saml/node-saml | <5.1.0 | 5.1.0 |
| GHSA-4mxg-3p6v-xgq3 | npm | passport-saml | <=3.2.4 | no fix published |
| GHSA-4mxg-3p6v-xgq3 | npm | @node-saml/passport-saml | <5.1.0 | 5.1.0 |
Red Hat rates this Important.
This is a Important impact authn-bypass, not a Moderate bug, because it breaks the core trust boundary of SAML: the service provider (SP) makes authorization decisions based on an assertion it believes is protected by the IdP’s XML signature. In @node-saml/node-saml ≤5.0.1, the library verifies the signature over one part of the response but then parses/uses fields from the original, unsigned document, a classic signature-wrapping/mismatch flaw. An attacker who possesses any validly signed SAML response (e.g., their own login, a captured response, or one from a lower-privileged account) can alter critical elements—such as the Subject/NameID (e.g., drop a character to map to a different user), group/role attributes, AuthnContext, or Conditions—without invalidating the signature, and the SP will accept the modified values. That enables account takeover, privilege escalation, MFA/step-up bypass (via AuthnContext changes), and policy circumvention across every SP relying on this library. The only prerequisite is access to a single signed response; no IdP compromise is required.
Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base or stability.
| Product | Package | State | Advisory |
|---|---|---|---|
| Red Hat Developer Hub 1.7 | rhdh/rhdh-hub-rhel9:1.7.0-1754936470 | Fixed 2025-08-19 | RHSA-2025:14090 |
| Red Hat Developer Hub 1 | rhdh/rhdh-rhel9-operator | Not affected |
Contains Red Hat Security Data © Red Hat, Inc., licensed under CC BY 4.0. Source: https://access.redhat.com/security/data. Modified: reformatted. Red Hat's page for CVE-2025-54419.
The attack patterns MITRE's CAPEC relates to this record's weaknesses, as MITRE names them. Credits. More on the page of CWE-287.