TI’s BLE stack caches and reuses the LTK’s property for a bonded mobile. A LTK can be an unauthenticated-and-no-MITM-protection key created by Just Works or an authenticated-and-MITM-protection key created by Passkey Entry, Numeric Comparison or OOB. Assume that a victim mobile uses secure pairing to pair with a victim BLE device based on TI chips and generate an authenticated-and-MITM-protection LTK. If a fake mobile with the victim mobile’s MAC address uses Just Works and pairs with the victim device, the generated LTK still has the property of authenticated-and-MITM-protection. Therefore, the fake mobile can access attributes with the authenticated read/write permission.
Severity
CVSS 3.1
6.8 medium
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
EPSS
0.7%(unchanged from 0.7% a week ago; 0.7% 30 days ago) estimated probability of exploitation activity in the next 30 days; 54th percentile. Scored 2026-11-21. A forecast for this CVE across the internet, not for your own systems.
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