An issue was discovered in SMA Solar Technology products. An attacker can use Sunny Explorer or the SMAdata2+ network protocol to update the device firmware without ever having to authenticate. If an attacker is able to create a custom firmware version that is accepted by the inverter, the inverter is compromised completely. This allows the attacker to do nearly anything: for example, giving access to the local OS, creating a botnet, using the inverters as a stepping stone into companies, etc. NOTE: the vendor reports that this attack has always been blocked by "a final integrity and compatibility check." Also, only Sunny Boy TLST-21 and TL-21 and Sunny Tripower TL-10 and TL-30 could potentially be affected
Severity
CVSS 3.0
9.8 critical
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
EPSS
2.2%(unchanged from 2.2% a week ago; 2.2% 30 days ago) estimated probability of exploitation activity in the next 30 days; 83rd percentile. Scored 2026-11-22. A forecast for this CVE across the internet, not for your own systems.
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