The TLS protocol 1.2 and earlier supports the rsa_fixed_dh, dss_fixed_dh, rsa_fixed_ecdh, and ecdsa_fixed_ecdh values for ClientCertificateType but does not directly document the ability to compute the master secret in certain situations with a client secret key and server public key but not a server secret key, which makes it easier for man-in-the-middle attackers to spoof TLS servers by leveraging knowledge of the secret key for an arbitrary installed client X.509 certificate, aka the "Key Compromise Impersonation (KCI)" issue.
Severity
CVSS 3.1
8.1 high
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
EPSS
1.9%(unchanged from 1.9% a week ago; 1.9% 30 days ago) estimated probability of exploitation activity in the next 30 days; 81st percentile. Scored 2026-11-21. A forecast for this CVE across the internet, not for your own systems.
Show the promptExplain CVE-2015-8960 for an engineer deciding whether to act. Use https://cve.bz/api/public/cves/CVE-2015-8960?via=ask-ai-copy and https://cve.bz/cve/CVE-2015-8960?via=ask-ai-copy as the source of truth: what is affected and which versions fix it, whether it is in CISA KEV, public exploits, and its EPSS (an internet-wide 30-day estimate of exploitation activity, not a forecast for my systems). If they give no fixed versions, use the CVE record https://cveawg.mitre.org/api/cve/CVE-2015-8960 or the vendor advisory, not third-party mirrors. Tell me how to check whether I am affected and how to verify a fix. Cite the sources and say where they are uncertain.
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